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Abstract

PROBABILITY ELICITATION METHODS FOR AVOIDING BIASES: AN
EXPOSITION
By Bethany H. Mihajlovits, B.S.
A thesis submitted in partial fulfillment of the requirements for the degree of Masters of
Science at Virginia Commonwealth University.
Virginia Commonwealth University, 2009
Major Director: Dr. Jason R.W. Merrick
Director of Graduate Planning, Department of Statistical Sciences and Operations
Research

A large portion of decision analysis lies in a decision maker’s uncertainty about an
outcome and what they perceive is the chance (probability) of that outcome occurring (in
other words, an individual’s “degree of belief” that an outcome will occur). However,
thinking probabilistically can be difficult and we rely on “rather primitive cognitive
techniques to make” such assessments (these techniques are termed heuristics) (Clemen &
Reilly, 2001 p.311). Heuristics are simple and intuitive but tend to result in probabilities
that are biased. This thesis will connect the literature available from both the psychology
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behind the biases and the mathematical problems associated with the probability elicitation
itself. Additionally, this thesis will present a better understanding of the biases that distort
the probability elicitation for the decision maker along with suggestions for improving
such assessments.
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CHAPTER 1 Introduction
The overall process of arriving at an informed decision, that is at present a best
value, is often a long and tedious process that can consist of multiple quantitative and
qualitative values, varying degrees of uncertainty associated with the likelihood of events,
and differing opinions from various people concerning what is most important about the
decision at hand. Decision analysis exists to assist a decision maker in choosing the best
option available with decisions that exhibit such difficulty. This thesis will focus on the
uncertainty aspect of decision analysis and specifically the biases that are associated with
probability assessment, methods used for eliciting uncertainty from an individual with
knowledge of a specific field, and ways to improve the assessments provided.
Probability elicitation is not a strictly academic situation. Many documented
instances exist where decision makers have had to use probabilities assessed by experts to
make a proper decision. Chapter two reviews some of these real life decisions that were
made with decision analysis that incorporate the use of probability assessments from
subject matter experts.
There are a wide variety of biases that may be brought about with the probability
assessments provided by a subject matter expert. These biases can be produced
purposefully for motivational reasons or as a simple cognitive misjudgment. In general,
humans have developed two separate means of drawing conclusions from data: a reasoning
1

ability for processing mental representations, and a judgmental ability for characterizing
stimuli along key dimensions (Benson et al, 1995). Wallsten and Budescu (1983) postulate
that when a subject is asked to provide a probability of an event’s occurrence, the
individual will search their memory for applicable knowledge, combine that knowledge
with the information at hand, and attempt to provide the best feasible judgment. Therefore,
the judgment provided depends on the subject’s memory, the current information aspects,
and also the order in which the subject generally processes information. Gigerenzer et al
(1991) presents literature suggesting that memory is “excellent in storing frequency
information from various environments and the registering of event occurrences for
frequency judgments is fairly automatic cognitive process requiring very little attention or
conscious effort” (p.510). This series of cognitive processes that occur without effort in the
subject leaves much room for error of interpretation of uncertainty and that error can be
presented as a biased assessment. This thesis will review several biases including some
that are associated with the cognitive processes termed heuristics. “Heuristics are
essentially informal arguments employed by subjects in bringing evidence to bear upon the
propositions in question” (Benson et al, 1995 p.1641).
A main goal of probability elicitation is to avoid any biases (or adjust those that
surface) that will present themselves due either to heuristics or motivational purposes.
Thus, proper probability elicitation methods are reviewed in chapter four that will
hopefully minimize any biases that could present themselves and create havoc on the
uncertainty aspect of the problem itself. Training the experts to recognize biases associated
with cognitive processes is a preferred method for avoiding them entirely. For the few
2

biases not avoided with a proper elicitation procedure, chapter five reviews methodology
for improving expert probability assessments. These methods may also be used during the
elicitation process and they work not only to eliminate biases but also to improve the
probability assessments so that a more accurate and better decision can be made. Often
times, a motivational bias can work its way into the subject’s psyche presenting inaccurate
assessments that can be damaging to the integrity of the decision. The final chapter,
Scoring Rules, reviews how scoring rules can be used to encourage honesty in forecasting.

3

CHAPTER 2 Applications of Probability Elicitation
There are many major decisions that are made based on probability assessments
which are supplied from subject matter experts. There are a variety of ways to elicit these
expert judgments and many fields of study have already performed these procedures and
analyzed subsequent expert probability assessments to arrive at better decisions. Five
studies will be covered that had to perform an elicitation procedure to extract probabilities
or probability distributions from experts in a given field. North and Stengel (1982)
brought to the surface a methodology for major decisions in the development of magnetic
fusion energy. Keeney, Sarin, and Winkler (1984) developed a risk assessment model to
relate adverse health effects to alternative carbon monoxide standards. Winkler and Poses
(1993) presented a probability analysis on the survivability of intensive care unit patients.
DeWispelare, Herren, and Clemen (1995) were concerned with acquiring accurate
probabilistic judgments for future conditions at a high-level nuclear waste repository.
Lastly, a decision analysis model, incorporating risk aversion and probabilistic
dependence, for bidding oil and gas lease sales was provided by Donald Keefer (1991).
The U.S. magnetic fusion program was looking for a way to provide an
inexhaustible energy supply within the next century (North & Stengel, 1982). North and
Stengel (1982) present the problem of deciding what facility to fund for the U.S. magnetic
fusion energy program. This problem is plagued by uncertain strategic outcomes, vague
4

available alternatives, and successes that are not measured in simple terms. Because this is
a long-term program, it naturally involves multiple decisions and to keep the analysis cost
to a minimum, only a critical decision (and a subset of crucial decisions) were processed.
The set of critical and crucial decisions encompass the building timeframe and the nature
of the major test facilities. The test facility decision comes with a considerable number of
uncertainties to include commercial reactor performance, environmental concerns, time
considerations, and commercial market acceptance. To maintain a workable model some
assumptions involving performance, cost and feasibility were made.
In the North and Stengel (1982) study, the following probabilities needed to be
assessed in order to complete the decision tree: probability of commercialization of the
leading fusion concept; probability of distribution over five-year increments; probability of
distribution on the status of competing electric energy technologies; and the probability
distribution on magnetic fusion reactor performance for each concept. The type of analysis
that was being performed required a probability value, any and all of the above mentioned,
be assigned to each path option in their influence diagram structure. North and Stengel
were aware of the conscious and unconscious biases that can surface with the probability
elicitation process. They referenced the work of Tversky and Kahneman (1974) when
developing their interview process. The probability assessments were created in two
interviews with staff members knowledgeable in fusion research and program planning.
Each interview, meant to develop a complete set of probability inputs for the decision tree
analysis, was approximately three hours in length and incorporated a process that helped
avoid biases.
5

A final optimal result was not reached due to the usage of illustrative data that was
not based on a thorough consultation with energy experts. However, several tendencies in
the outcome suggested that nominal development of the systems was slightly better than
the accelerated option and the delay option. North and Stengel (1982) conclude that the
systematic assessment of performance, cost, and time of commercial availability, built up
from engineering judgment, is the strongpoint of the methodology.
Keeney, Sarin, and Winkler (1984) offered an analysis that addressed the
“complexities inherent to ambient air quality standard-setting problems” by developing a risk
assessment model that relates adverse health effects to alternative carbon monoxide standards
(p.518). Keeney et al implement an individual interviewing process for multiple scientists to
avoid any cognitive biases involving dependence.
Three major and five minor health effects were identified as resultants of CO exposure
in the Keeney et al study. The overall problem of determining the number of people that would
suffer from the health effects (and the magnitude of suffering) based on each alternative CO
standard is too complex a problem to solve without decomposition. Because experimentation
was not a viable approach due to ethical consideration, professional judgments on estimates of
health risks from CO exposure were obtained by interviewing numerous medical and health
experts. A representative sampling of experts were individually interviewed on multiple
occasions, either in person or over the phone, with time lengths ranging from 30 minutes to
two hours. Each expert was interviewed individually to attempt to preserve independence of
opinion. In each interview, the experts were asked for a qualitative identification of health
effects and its corresponding probability. The same information was elicited from different
perspectives to allow for any inconsistencies and redundancy of information. The fractile
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method and direct probability assessments were used to quantify the probability distributions.
The fractile method is an assessment procedure where a value (e.g. ‘x’) is adjusted until an
indifference point between lotteries is reached by the subject for a particular percentile (e.g.
0.35). Thus the value (x) at that indifference point is the fractile of the distribution (i.e. x is the
0.35 fractile of the distribution) (Clemen & Reilly, 2001). It was noted that like most
assessment procedures, the experts were reluctant at first to quantify their judgments but
became more willing throughout the course of the process. Overall, the responses revealed
substantial stability and consistency.
In an attempt to estimate health risks associated with variable CO levels, the
methodology in the study by Keeney et al was applied to four cities with varying magnitudes
of risk, response estimates, and exposure rates. The relative values across the standards did not
vary as greatly suggesting that “the relative ordering of standards in terms of risk estimates
may not change with the refinements in exposure data” (Keeney et al, 1984 p.527). Lastly,
although the individual interviews provided good estimates, an expert group meeting could
have proven beneficial.

Winkler and Poses (1993) surmise that a physician assessed probability of survival
can be of interest to the patient or another physician making a prognosis or decision regarding
treatment. Their article analyzes “data from an observational study in which physicians with
different levels of experience in critical care medicine and different familiarity with the patient
assess the probability that a patient admitted to an intensive care unit in a teaching hospital
would survive until discharge from the hospital” (Winkler & Poses, 1993). The intent of the
paper is to present an extensive analysis of both assessed probabilities and combination

7

probabilities by evaluating the ability of the physicians to assess probabilities of survival of
ICU patients.
Quantitative probability assessments of the patient’s survival were obtained as soon as
possible (usually within an hour) after admittance from four physicians: an intern (the least
experienced), the critical care fellow (three years post MD training), the critical care attending
physician (five years post MD training), and the primary physician. No training or feedback
was provided to the physicians except the critical care attending physicians. The critical care
attendings were the only group to know of the study’s purpose and thus maintain awareness in
probabilistic judgment. Each physician saw a differing number of patients because the study
involved actual patients admitted to an ICU, and ICU staffing patterns are variable. An overall
evaluation was done in addition to looking at a number of individual quality measures
including the distributions of probabilities and outcomes, summary measure of such
distributions, and decompositions of scoring rules. A quadratic scoring rule called the Brier
score was used for the overall evaluation as it integrates discrimination and calibration and is
influenced by the base rate (scoring rules will be defined in chapter 6). As for the distributions
of probability assessments, the primaries gave extremely high probabilities much more often
than the others (with a relatively low number in the middle sections), the critical care
attendings seldom used extremely high probabilities but used the middle sections much more
often, and the interns and critical care fellows tended to be in between the two extremes.
Lastly, the primaries were particularly good at identifying patients who would survive. A
regression was run to determine if a model using the probabilities could improve upon the
physician’s performance. The outcome provided hardly any change in the Brier scores,

8

suggesting that any patterns in the data that might be capitalized on to improve assessment
were very minor.
The general concept of getting additional information is to get to a better decision.
Additionally, obtaining multiple forecasts and combining them leads to improved forecasting
performance. The best combination was the primary physician and the critical care attending.
In general, “the worst combination of two probabilities does better than the average of the four
individual Brier scores, and the combination of all four probabilities does better than the best
individual Brier score. Thus, obtaining additional opinions not only leads to improved
performance on average, but results in reductions in the risk of poor performance” (Winkler &
Poses, 1993 p.1534). These results were based on simple averages of probabilities.
The analysis showed that the physicians most familiar with the patient and most
familiar with intensive care were the best performers, individually and in combination. Some
biases could have affected the assessments including ego bias which could lead to higher
assessments for a desirable outcome (like survival), hanging crepe bias where lower
assessments are given so not to raise hopes, and uncertainty bias where the physicians are
inclined to express their uncertainty by using less extreme probabilities. Winkler and Poses
recommend that some improvements in assessment might be reached by providing training on
probability assessment, providing feedback on performance, having the physicians assess
probabilities on a regular basis for experience, and having a group probability be presented
after a collaboration of physicians.

The performances of high-level nuclear waste geologic repositories have to be
assessed for a 10000 year regulatory period as stipulated by the Environmental Protection
Agency (EPA) (DeWispelare et al, 1995). Specifically, the study presented by
9

DeWispelare, Herren, and Clemen (1995) was concerned with acquiring probabilistic
judgment through expert elicitation of future climate parameters in the Yucca Mountain
Nevada vicinity (YMNV).
The formal elicitation procedure used for this DeWispelare et al (1995) study
consisted of eleven steps: determine the objectives and goals of the study; recruit the
experts; identify issues and information needs; provide initial data to the experts; conduct
the elicitation training session; discuss and refine the issues; provide a multi-week study
period; conduct the elicitations; provide post-elicitation feedback to the experts; aggregate
the experts’ judgments (if required); and document the process. The eleven steps were
then broken into five strictly sequential phases: pre-training activities (steps one through
four); training (step five); study period (steps six through seven); elicitation (step eight);
and follow-up (steps nine through eleven). The intent of the training process was to
provide the experts with knowledge of potential biases that can be encountered during the
elicitation process. The discussion process should be used by the experts to refine the
initial conceptual scenarios to arrive at an unambiguous definition of the events to be
elicited and result in a convenient model that they can proceed with into individual
research efforts. Individual elicitations were conducted by having each expert prepare a
document that provided the basis of their judgments, bringing them together into a
common meeting and presenting each paper to the group for clarification and reasoning of
assessments, and then interviewing each individual afterwards to obtain probabilities. The
experts then reviewed the results to ensure that they accurately reflected the information
provided in the elicitation.
10

As for the aggregation of expert judgments, “aggregating judgments across a group
of experts provides a distribution that attempts to summarize the state of knowledge across
the group” (DeWispelare et al, 1995 p.18). The two ways of aggregating the judgments of
experts are behavioral, when the experts themselves produce a combined or consensus
view or mechanical, when a central analyst is responsible for the aggregation by applying
an aggregation formula.
DeWispelare et al make some concluding remarks of the documentation needs and
general comments on the study including information from the experts themselves. “Expert
judgments, elicited through a formal expert elicitation process, will be scrutable and the
rationales used to reach the judgments will be documented” (DeWispelare et al, 1995
p.21). The experts felt that the training session to make aware the potential biases involved
was essential, and that they had little difficulty in representing their judgments as
probability distributions. The consensus distributions that were generated behaviorally
were not necessarily similar to the ones generated from mechanical combination
techniques. It is the responsibility of the decision maker to determine if and how to
combine the individual distributions. Finally, the mechanical aggregation of the individual
expert judgments is an efficient, feasible, and appropriate way to satisfy the needs of
modelers (DeWispelare et al, 1995).
“Bidding for offshore U.S. oil and gas leases is a major corporate resource allocation
problem involving enormous uncertainties and very high stakes” (Keefer, 1991 p.377). Donald
Keefer (1991) developed operationally useful decision analysis models that incorporate risk

aversion and probabilistic dependence among the lease values for bidding at oil and gas
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lease sales in his article. This paper considers three expected utility models that use
exponential utility functions and include both bids and partnership shares as potential
decision variables. Probability elicitation is needed for this study to determine the certainty
equivalents of the increasing levels of risk aversion for each of the three models presented.
Thanks to the documentation of several decision studies that were performed, we
can see that probability elicitation from experts is indeed a widely used method for
combating uncertainty in a problem. Unfortunately, there are many biases that are usually
associated with the probability elicitation process. The main biases that are present in most
elicitation procedures are discussed in the following chapter.

12

CHAPTER 3 The Problem: Heuristics and Biases
As previously noted, people have a tendency to incorporate both conscious and
unconscious biases into their predictions of uncertainty. A valid reason for this is that we,
as humans, tend to use rather “primitive cognitive techniques” termed heuristics to assess
uncertainty (Clemen & Reilly, 2001). Clemen and Reilly (2001) stated that “heuristics are
easy and intuitive ways to deal with uncertain situations, but they tend to result in
probability assessments that are biased in different ways depending on the heuristic used”
(p.311). Tversky and Kahneman (1974) define three heuristics that are used to assess
probabilities and their associated biases. The three heuristics are representativeness,
availability, and anchoring and adjusting. There are additional biases that have been
observed and are not specific to the proposed heuristics. There are a lot of instances where
these heuristics and biases have been observed.
The representative heuristic is assessing a probability that someone or something
belongs to a specific category (Clemen & Reilly, 2001). More generally it is the method in
which probabilities are evaluated “by the degree to which A is representative of B, that is,
the degree to which A resembles B” (Tversky & Kahneman, 1974 p.1124). This heuristic
involves making the judgment by comparing the information provided on the subject with
a stereotypical member of the category. The better the resemblance between the two, the
higher the probability is that the subject will be placed into the category. There are a
13

multitude of biases that result from the representative heuristic: base rate bias, prior
probability bias, insensitivity to sample size, incorrect interpretation of randomness,
insensitivity to predictability, illusion of validity, and failure to regress.
The prior probability, or base-rate frequency, of an outcome is often neglected
when people evaluate probability with representativeness. The base-rate should have an
effect on the probability assessment but is often overlooked. To illustrate this concept
consider the example of Tom W from Kahneman and Tversky (1973), whereby a
description of Tom is provided that implies he is introverted, mechanically minded,
lacking in creativity, and well organized. This description is given to a group of people so
that they may assess the likelihood that Tom is a graduate student in various academic
fields. Consequently, the assessors allowed the stereotyped properties of Tom W’s
description to command their decision versus incorporating the population statistics for
each field of study. Many such studies were performed by Tversky and Kahneman (1974);
some with stereotyping descriptions, some with no descriptions, and still some with nonspecific descriptions. The overall response from these studies was that when no
descriptions were given, prior probabilities were utilized correctly, when descriptions were
introduced, prior probabilities were ignored.
The next bias caused by the representative heuristic is insensitivity to sample size,
where people assess the likelihood of a sample result by the resemblance of the result to
the corresponding population parameter. Tversky and Kahneman (1974) perform a study
where a small hospital and a large hospital each recorded the number of times that the daily
percentage of boys born reached 60% or greater (versus the norm of 50%). Students were
14

then asked which hospital would have recorded more days of 60% male born population or
if the two hospitals were approximately equal in results. Most assessors believed the two
hospitals should have been approximately equal because they are representative of the
general population. These assessments were obviously made without taking into account
the theory that the smaller hospital would have a greater chance at the 60% because a large
sample is less likely to stray from the mean (50% male population born). Lastly, the
judgment of posterior probabilities, the probability that a sample was chosen from one
population versus another, has also accounted for such insensitivity. In this case the
assessments are dominated by the sample proportion and thus unaffected by the sample
size.
An incorrect interpretation of randomness, where one expects that the condensed
sequence of events of a random process is representative of the actual process, is another
bias produced by the representative heuristic (Tversky & Kahneman, 1974). A good
example is when people view the sequence H-T-H-H-T-H of a flip of a coin as more likely
than H-H-H-T-T-T because it appears to be more random, even though both are just as
likely. This also includes the gambler’s fallacy; when a gambler believes that a black is due
after a long run of red on the roulette wheel because a black would start to restore the
equilibrium of the process. Tversky and Kahneman (1974) note that, “deviations are not
‘corrected’ as a chance process unfolds, they are merely diluted” (p.1125).
Insensitivity to predictability occurs when assessors make predictions (e.g., the
outcome of game or future value of stock) based on descriptions and their favorability
instead of evidence and the expected accuracy of prediction (Tversky & Kahneman, 1974).
15

It should be that if no description is available or relevant, predictions should mirror one
another and furthermore, the higher the predictability, the wider the range of values.
However, throughout the course of many studies, subjects have shown little regard for the
considerations of predictability.
“The unwarranted confidence which is produced by a good fit between the
predicted outcome and the input information may be called the illusion of validity”
(Tversky & Kahneman, 1974 p.1126). It will endure even when the assessor is aware of
his/her own prediction accuracy limiting factors. An example provided by Tversky and
Kahneman (1974) states that assessors are more confident in predicting the final grade
point average of a student with first year grades consisting solely of B’s versus that of a
student with A’s and C’s because people have greater confidence in predictions based on
redundancy. Nevertheless, a prediction based on several inputs is able to achieve higher
accuracy when independence is prevalent instead of correlation or redundancy. Thus, even
though redundancy increases confidence, it decreases accuracy, and the resulting
judgments are potentially confidently bad.
The last bias associated with the representative heuristic is the concept of failure to
regress. There is a general phenomenon called regression toward the mean which is the
notion that for random events, extreme cases will tend to be followed by less extreme cases
(Clemen & Reilly, 2001). Despite the fact that this notion has been around for more than
100 years, people generally do not develop accurate intuitions concerning it. People do not
expect to see it in many situations where it is likely to happen and even when the
occurrence is recognized, they come up with explanations for it (Tversky & Kahneman,
16

1974). Tversky and Kahneman (1974) reference a study concerning a flight training
instructor in which he praised a student pilot for a smooth landing, whose subsequent
landing was considerably worse, and criticized a different student pilot for a rough landing,
whose subsequent landing was considerably better. This led the instructor to conclude that
verbal praise was detrimental and verbal criticism was beneficial. The instructor failed to
recognize that the student pilot who performed badly was probably performing below his
average level and would likely perform closer to his mean next time around, no matter the
consequences involved. The same goes for the student pilot who executed a tremendous
landing; he would probably perform closer to his average (which would be a worse
landing) for the subsequent flight without regard to consequence or praise. Thus, the
instructor failed to recognize that the students were regressing to the mean and actually
overestimated the effect of punishment and underestimated the effect of praise.
The availability heuristic is when a probability of an event’s occurrence is assessed
based on the ease with which we can retrieve similar events from memory (Clemen &
Reilly, 2001). It is often easier to recall instances of large classes than those of less
frequent classes. External events and influences can have a substantial impact the
availability of similar incidents. The biases associated with the availability heuristic are:
overestimation when events are more easily remembered, underestimation when events are
harder to recall, effectiveness of a search set bias, imaginability bias, illusory correlation,
and hindsight bias.
A bias is created when the size of class is assessed by the ability to retrieve its
instances thus; a class with easily retrievable instances will appear more numerous than
17

that of class whose instances are less retrievable (Tversky & Kahneman, 1974). Familiarity
is not the only factor for this bias, salience also affects retrievability. Tversky and
Kahneman (1974) note this with the idea that seeing a burning house is a greater impact for
assessment than just reading about a house fire. Also recent activity is more retrievable
than earlier activity, therefore the probability judgment concerning automobile accidents
will rise temporarily when a person witnesses an overturned vehicle.
The availability heuristic also provides us with biases due to the effectiveness of a
search set and different tasks elicit different search sets (Tversky & Kahneman, 1974). The
example provided by Tversky and Kahneman (1974) is the supposition that an individual
samples a random three letter word from the dictionary. The ensuing question is “is it more
likely that the word starts with r or that r is the third letter?” People judge the word to be
more likely to begin with r because it is easier to search for words by their first letter
despite the fact that consonants, such as r, are more frequent in the third position versus the
first.
When a frequency assessment is necessary for a class that is not stored in memory,
but can be generated by a rule, a bias of imaginability can occur (Tversky & Kahneman,
1974). Typically for this situation the assessor will think up multiple instances and assess
the frequency based on the ease of the instance construction. The ease of construction does
not always reflect the accurate frequency. Imaginability has an important role in the
probability assessment of real life situations. The example provided by Tversky and
Kahneman (1974) associates the risk involved with an adventurous expedition is evaluated
by imagining the things that can go wrong and can’t be dealt with. If a whole lot of these
18

instances can be thought up, the trip can seem overly dangerous even if their actual
likelihood of occurrence is very small. On the other hand, the risk involved may be
underestimated if some dangers are not imagined.
The illusory correlation bias is a disconnect in the judgment of the frequency of the
co-occurrence of two events (Tversky & Kahneman, 1974). Tversky and Kahneman (1974)
presented the draw-a-person test. It was a situation where subjects were given a diagnosis
of a mental patient and a portrait drawing made by the patient. The subjects then estimated
the frequency of a particular diagnosis accompanied by distinguishing facial features on
the drawing. The subjects overestimated the co-occurrence frequency of natural associates,
such as peculiar eyes and suspiciousness, because suspiciousness is more readily
associated with the eyes than any other body part. When an associative bond is strong
between two events, they are assumed to occur together frequently.
The hindsight bias is when a subject misremembers the degree to which he
previously forecasted an event’s occurrence, and generally the forecast is remembered to
be more accurate than it was (Mellers & Locke, 2007). One reason for this bias is that most
people are better able to recall information that was consistent with the outcome versus
information that was inconsistent. Mellers and Locke (2007) review a study performed by
Fischoff and Beyth (1975) involved students that were initially asked to predict what
would happen in 1972 when Nixon visited China and then later asked to recall their
probability assessments. Majority of the students recalled themselves being more accurate
at the two week interval (67%) and most all students recalled better accuracy at the three to
sixth month interval (84%).
19

An individual will often assess a probability by selecting an initial anchor point
(suggested either by formulation of the problem or by result of partial computation) and
then adjust the anchor based on their knowledge of the specific event (Clemen & Reilly,
2001). Tversky and Kahneman (1974) term this heuristic anchoring and adjusting. The
adjustments are usually inadequate since different estimates are obtained because they
yield to the different starting positions. The anchoring and adjusting heuristic also has
multiple biases: insufficient adjustment, biases in the evaluation of conjunctive and
disjunctive events, anchoring in the assessment of subjective probability distributions,
overconfidence, and even conservatism.
The insufficient adjustment bias typifies the anchoring heuristic in general
(Tversky & Kahneman, 1974). Anchoring occurs regardless of whether the initial value
was provided to the subject or they arrived at it from an incomplete computation. Tversky
and Kahneman (1974) illustrate this with a study done with high school students were they
were provided a numerical expression (one ascending (1x2x3x4x5x6x7x8) or one
descending (8x7x6x5x4x3x2x1)) and only five seconds to estimate the product. The
median estimate for the ascending sequence was considerably smaller than the estimate for
the descending sequence because the first few steps of multiplication for the descending
sequence was higher than the ascending sequence.
Studies of probability judgments suggest that people are inclined to overestimate
the probabilities of conjunctive events and underestimate the probability of disjunctive
events (Tversky & Kahneman, 1974). This is the bias in the evaluation of conjunctive and
disjunctive events. Tversky and Kahneman (1974) state that planning events prove a
20

significant bias since they are typically conjunctive because they are comprised of a series
of events that must occur to accomplish completion. Even with each event having a high
likelihood, the probability of success can actually be very small if there are many events to
consider. Thus, there is general tendency of unjustifiable optimism due to the
overestimation of the likelihood of a conjunctive event. Conversely, people tend to
underestimate the likelihood of failure in complex systems.
Another bias of anchoring and adjusting is anchoring in the assessment of
subjective probability distributions (Tversky & Kahneman, 1974). A probability
distribution is often constructed by asking the assessor to evaluate specific percentiles then
producing the distribution curve with the points provided. Once several different
distributions are collected, the judge can then be tested for proper calibration. Liberman
and Tversky (1993) define proper calibration as when a decision maker has his/her
judgments match the corresponding frequencies. This is different than being resolute;
when decision maker can discriminate between events that do and do not occur. Over the
course of many probability elicitations the distributions provided by the experts indicated
“large and systematic departures from proper calibration” (Tversky & Kahneman, 1974).
This means that the subjects provided overly narrow confidence intervals that suggest their
certainty does not coincide with their knowledge base of the assessed quantities. The
elicitation procedure also affects the degree of calibration. Calibration will be further
reviewed in chapter 5.
The overconfidence bias is associated with the hard easy effect and is created when
people make the mistake of overestimating their knowledge (Clemen & Reilly, 2001).
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Gigerenzer, Hoffrage and Kleinbölting (1991) provided the description that the
overconfidence effect occurs when the confidence judgments are larger than the relative
frequencies of the correct answers. The hard-easy effect occurs when the degree of
overconfidence increases with the difficulty of the questions, where the difficulty is
measure by the percentage of correct answers. Continuously, confidence in one’s
immediate and spontaneous knowledge (rather than long term reflection) is largely
determined by the structure of the task and the structure of a corresponding, known
environment in a person’s long-term memory. Gigerenzer et al (1991) provide a
framework, probabilistic mental model, which explains the overconfidence effect and
predicts the conditions under which the effect appears. This framework is detailed below.
Brenner, Koehler, and Liberman (1996) note that the selection of difficult questions leads
to “spurious” overconfidence, conversely the deliberate exclusion of difficult questions is
likely to produce underconfidence. Through studies and research Brenner et al determine
that the major (not sole) reason for overconfidence is question difficulty and not how the
questions are selected (i.e. random vs. nonrandom selection). Liberman and Tversky
(1993) distinguish between two types of overconfidence; specific, referring to the
overestimation of the probability of a specific event, and generic, referring to the
overestimation of the probability of the event that the subject considers most likely.
Lastly, Mellers and Locke (2007) correlate overconfidence to the above average effect,
“closely related is the above average effect when people perceive themselves as being
better than others on most desirable attributes, including honesty, cooperativeness, etc.”
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Keren (1997) suggests the idea that overconfidence and the hard-easy effect may be
due to regression towards the mean. Keren (1997) notes that even though regression
towards the mean may induce overconfidence, the concept does not rule out genuine
overconfidence. Additionally, even unbiased estimates are subject to random error and the
larger the random error the larger the regression effect. As for genuine overconfidence,
Keren (1997) reviews a study that he previously performed with bridge players that
suggests that at least part of the exhibited overconfidence “was genuine and caused by
cognitive or motivational factors” (p.273). Some of these factors may include a subject
who tends to think more in terms of positive reasons and consequently affirmative
evidence appears larger than disconfirming evidence; that overestimation of our
intellectual abilities is actually deeply rooted in humans; a social norm that encourages
overconfidence because knowledge is prized and ignorance is appalling; and/or a self
motivation mechanism (e.g. a soccer fan believes his favorite team will win even if losing
at the midpoint of the game).
Another bias from the anchoring and adjusting heuristic is the conservatism bias
suggested by Wallsten and Budescu (1983). Conservatism is a bias towards the prior
probabilities when a subject is in a position to revise their posterior probabilities, thus high
probabilities are underestimated and low values are overestimated. There is confusion
however, concerning whether this bias is formed from subjects who are accurately
reporting their misguided opinions or if it is from subjects who are biased in translating
their accurate judgments to probabilities. In addition, conservatism appears to be situation
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dependent and is not necessarily specific to the subject’s behavior (Wallsten & Budescu,
1983).
Mellers and Locke (2007) also provided some insight into framing effects and their
bias towards judgment. When people consider different choices they often accept and
utilize the information as it was received leading to systematic differences in preference
known as framing effects. Behavioral decision researchers discovered that when the same
option is offered but with different frames, people will repeatedly reverse their preferences.
A good example is providing decision makers with a decision concerning an unknown
Asian disease expected to kill 600 people presented by Tversky and Kahneman (1981).
The two frames present the same situation differently: the gain frame has a program A in
which 200 people will be saved and a program B where there is a 1/3 chance that 600
people will be saved and 2/3 chance that no-one will, and the loss frame has a program A
in which 400 people will die and a program B where there is a 1/3 that no one will die and
a 2/3 chance that 600 people will die. Despite that fact that the situation for each program
was the same in both frames, the majority of people preferred the gain frame. Mellers and
Locke (2007) stated it best with “frames are subtle, yet consequential” (p.9).
Similar to framing effects is the idea that stimuli contexts, either local or global,
can alter a response from a subject (Mellers & Locke, 2007). The explanation of this idea
is that responses to the same event will differ based on the surrounding stimuli. The
example provided by Mellers and Locke is that a ten pound sack of apples will appear light
in weight after carrying a fifty pound child but will appear heavy in weight after carrying a
can of soda.
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Another noteworthy bias, discussed by Spetzler and Von Holstein (1975), is the
motivational bias. A motivational bias is when a subject adjusts an assessment based on
the perception of a personal reward for various responses. Thus, the subject may be
influencing the decision in his/her favor by giving a specific set of assessments. The
motivational bias can show up either consciously, a salesman predicting low sales so that
his numbers are greater than forecasted, or subconsciously, a doctor who gives a higher
likelihood of survival because she is hoping that a preferred patient will survive. Related
to the motivational bias is the ego bias, suggested by Winkler and Poses (1993), which is
an illusion of control that can lead to higher assessed probabilities of desired outcomes like
patient survival. Winkler and Poses (1993) also defined the “hanging crepe” bias, whereby
a physician may provide a lower probability of survival so as to not raise any hopes and
furthermore attribute any survival to the skill of the physician.
Gigerenzer et al (1991) claim that even though the cognitive bias research supports
that people naturally make mistakes in reasoning and memory, including overestimating
their knowledge, that people are in fact decent judges of the reliability of their knowledge
provided that it is representative of a specific reference class. Basically, the overconfidence
bias results as a consequence of selection instead of some deficient cognitive heuristic.
They present a framework that helps to explain a broad range of the experimental findings
concerning confidence, including inconsistencies. In addition, the theory for which this
framework is based deals with spontaneous confidence or an immediate reaction instead of
a product of long reflection.
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The framework presented by Gigerenzer et al (1991), exhibited by a flow chart in
figure 3.1, supports two strategies when presented with a two-alternative confidence task.
The first is for the subject to attempt to construct a local mental model (local MM) which
is a solution created by memory and elementary logic. The second strategy is to create a
probabilistic mental model (PMM) using probabilistic information from a natural
environment if the local MM fails. Figure 3.1, provided by Gigerenzer et al (1991, p.508),
are the cognitive processes in solving a two-alternative general-knowledge task with MM
representing a mental model and PMM representing a probabilistic mental model.

A local MM can be created successfully if the subject can retrieve precise figures
from memory for both alternatives, retrieve non-overlapping intervals, and have
elementary logical operations compensate for absent knowledge. The structure is as
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follows: first, the task is local, meaning only two alternatives are taken into account and
there is no generation of a reference class; second, it is direct, meaning no probabilities
cures are utilized and it only contains the target variable; third, only inferences of
elementary operations of deductive logic occur; and fourth, upon a successful search the
confidence in the produced knowledge is evaluated as certain (Gigerenzer et al,1991).
If a local MM cannot be created by the subject, a PMM is created and solves the
task with inductive inference by connecting the structure of the task with a corresponding
probability structure. The PMM differs from the local MM because it contains a reference
class, it uses a network of variables in addition to the target variable, hence it is neither
local nor direct, the cognitive process includes probabilistic inference, and uncertainty is
included in the outcome. The purpose of the reference class is to “determine which cues
can function as probability cues for the target variable and what their cue validities are,”
where cue validities are thought of as conditional probabilities (Gigerenzer et al,1991). The
probability cues are then generated, tested, and when possible, activated with the
assumption that the order in which cues are generated is based on the hierarchy of cue
validities. The end of the cue generation and testing cycle for typical general knowledge
questions comes if there is a time constraint or the number of problems is large and after
the first cue is found that can be activated if the activation rate of cues is small. The cue
validity determines the choice of answer and confidence judgment, with choice following
the rule; choose a if p (a | aC i b; R) > p (b | aC i b; R) , and the confidence, if a is chosen, that
a is correct is given by the cue validity; p(a | aC i b; R ) where a and b are objects that are
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included in reference class R and Ci is a probability cue for a target variable in R
(Gigerenzer et al,1991).
Gigerenzer et al (1991) also argue that the probabilities of single events
(confidences) and the relative frequencies are not evaluated by the same cognitive
processes. They state that the general knowledge tasks that are frequency tasks, i.e. involve
a judgment of the frequency of correct answers, can rarely be answered by creating a local
MM because the structure of the task contains one sequence of N questions and answers
with the number of correct answers being the target variable. In addition, the PMM’s of
frequency tasks and confidence tasks differ because each supports a different reference
class, the target variables are different, and the PMM of the frequency task will contain
different cues and cue validities. Overall, the PMM is what connects the task structure with
a known structure the subject’s environment and confidence and frequency judgments refer
to different kinds of reference classes (Gigerenzer et al,1991).
Five predictions are made from Gigerenzer et al (1991) concerning overconfidence
with relation to the PMM framework provided above. The first prediction is that “typical
general knowledge tasks elicit both overconfidence and accurate frequency judgments”
with the term typical referring to a set of questions that is “representative for the reference
class “sets of general knowledge questions”” (p.10). This condition is brought forth from
the notion that “if PMMs for confidence task are well adapted to an environment
containing a reference class R and the actual set of questions is not representative of R,
then confidence judgments exhibit overconfidence” (Gigerenzer et al, 1991 p.511). In
addition, if correct answer frequency question PMMs are well adapted with respect to a
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reference class R’ environment and the
actual set of questions is representative of
R’, then frequency judgments are expected
to be accurate. Combined, the statements
predict that the same subject will exhibit
overconfidence in a particular answer and
accurate estimates of a frequency of correct
answers. The two points on the left side of
figure 3.2, provided by Gigerenzer et al
(1991, p.511), are representative of this prediction.
The second prediction is that “if the set of general knowledge tasks is randomly
sampled from a natural environment, where natural environment denotes a knowledge
domain familiar to the subjects, we expect overconfidence to be zero, but frequency
judgments to exhibit underestimation” (Gigerenzer et al, 1991 p.512). This condition is
brought forth from the notion that “if PMMs for confidence tasks are well adapted with
respect to R and the actual set of questions is representative sample from R, then
overconfidence is expected to disappear” (Gigerenzer et al, 1991 p.512). In addition, if
correct answer frequency question PMMs are well adapted with respect to R’, and the
actual question set is not representative for R’ then frequency judgments are expected to be
underestimations of true frequency. The others side of figure 3.2 is representative of this
prediction.
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The third prediction is “comparing estimated relative frequencies with true relative
frequencies of correct answers makes overestimation disappear” (Gigerenzer et al, 1991
p.512). Basically, overestimation or underestimation is expected to be null if the set of
questions is randomly sampled. Thus, psychologically speaking there is a real distinction
between confidence and relative frequency wherein subjects do not believe a confidence
judgment of X% implies a relative frequency of X%.
Prediction four states, “if two sets, hard and easy, are generated by the same
sampling process, the hard easy effect is expected to be zero” (Gigerenzer et al, 1991
p.512). If both the hard and easy set deviate equally from representative sampling, points
will lie on a zero confidence parallel line.
The fifth and final prediction is “if there are two sets, one is a representative sample
from a reference class in a natural environment, the other is selected from another
reference class for being difficult, but the representative set is harder than the selected set;
then the hard easy is reversed” (Gigerenzer et al, 1991 p.512).
Gigerenzer et al performed two studies to test the first, second, and third
predictions. The results of the studies suggested that the first prediction is viable because
there were quite accurate frequency judgments that coexisted with overconfidence. The
second prediction was deemed viable because in the representative set, overestimation in
confidence judgments disappeared and zero overconfidence coexisted with frequency
judgments showing large underestimation. In the second study, overconfidence in single
answer coexisted with mostly accurate frequency judgments that showed slight
underestimation. For the third prediction, the subjects of the first study distinguished
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between confidence in single answers and relative frequency of correct answers which was
implied by the PMM theory where different reference classes are cued by confidence and
frequency tasks. The only finding that didn’t conform to prediction three was that the
magnitude of underestimation was not as pronounced as expected. The second study
resulted in the subject’s average estimated percentage correct was different from
confidence and similar to the actual percent correct.
Gigerenzer et al (1991) summarize that overconfidence results from one of two
causes or both jointly; “a PMM for a task is not properly adapted to a corresponding
environment, or the set of objects used is not a representative sample from the
corresponding reference class in the environment but is selected for difficulty” (p.25).
Therefore confidence should not be eliminated if the first cause is true and should be
eliminated if the second is true.
Brenner, Koehler, and Liberman (1996) disagree with the final results of
Gigerenzer et al (1991) because of new studies in the recent past. Brenner et al (1996)
state that the predictions of the PMM, that a random sampling of questions from a natural
domain will eliminate confidence and random sampling will eliminate the hard easy effect,
were both wrong. This is due to recent studies that show for questions of relatively high
difficulty, overconfidence is prevalent with random sampling of the questions from a
natural domain of knowledge. Brenner et al review a study done by Griffin and Tversky
(1992) whereby random pairs of states were selected (e.g. Virginia, Iowa) and subjects
were asked which state had a higher value for some attribute (e.g. population) with an
assessment of their confidence in each answer. The results showed significant
31

overconfidence for all attributes (contrary to first prediction) and also overconfidence for
the more difficult attributes (contrary to the second prediction).
The majority of biases that can be brought forth by the use of uncertainty in
decision making were presented in this chapter. The subsequent chapters will review some
proper methods for eliciting unbiased probabilities and other methods for improving the
assessments provided.
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CHAPTER 4 How To Elicit Probabilities Properly
Even though people can be irrational when left to their own devices, they are not
typically irrational in all situations, therefore an analyst should aim to structure a situation
where biases are minimized and the assessments determined actually symbolize the
subject’s opinions (Wallsten & Budescu, 1983). This chapter is aimed at providing the
methods to accomplish such a task. The methods presented by Spetzler and Von Holstein
(1975) and Keeney and Von Winterfeldt (1991) are aimed at eliciting accurate probabilities
while minimizing the effects of the biases presented in the previous chapter.
Spetzler and Von Holstein (1975) start with a set of five principles to use as a
guideline for encoding uncertain quantities, and violating any one of these principles can
lead to problems in the encoding process. The first principle is to choose only those
uncertainties that are important to the decision itself. Principle two is to define the quantity
as an unambiguous state variable; a state variable being one that has values beyond the
control of the decision maker. The third principle states that the quantity should be
structured carefully with thoughtful consideration to conditionalities. Principle four is to
define the quantity precisely by performing the clairvoyance test. The fifth and final
principle is to describe the quantity using an appropriate scale that the subject finds
meaningful, so that the subject doesn’t spend time trying to fit his/her answers to the scale
versus evaluating the uncertainty.
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When it comes to encoding methods, Spetzler and Von Holstein (1975) review the
P (probabilities) and V (values) methods for answers that can be represented as points on a
cumulative distribution function. There are three basic types of these methods: the Pmethod requires the subject to specify probability points with fixed values, the V-method
requires the subject to specify value points with fixed probabilities, and the PV-method
requires the subject to answer questions based on both scales simultaneously. These
methods are explained in more detail later by Clemen and Reilly (2001).
The above mentioned questions can either be answered directly, by providing
numbers, or indirectly, by choosing between alternatives until an indifference point is
determined. Direct assessment, or structured questioning, supports data generation with
questioning schemes that are designed to trigger elements in the subject’s associate
memory (Benson et al, 1995). There are multiple indirect response techniques to choose
from. One option is the probability wheel which is a disk with two adjustable sections and
a fixed pointer in which the subject determines which event is more likely until equality is
reached. Another option is to use fixed probability events whereby the subject is asked to
judge values that correspond to fixed probabilities. One can use the interval technique
whereby an interval is split and the subject is asked which bet is preferred then subintervals
are introduced until quartiles are determined. An additional option is the use of relative
likelihoods, which is when the subject is requested to assign odds to two well defined
events. There are also multiple direct response techniques to choose from. One option
involves cumulative probability and fractiles, whereby the subject is asked to assign the
cumulative probability at a given value or vise versa. A visual option involves the use of
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graphs in which the subject either draws or must choose one graph, out of several
provided, with a density function. Another option uses verbal encoding whereby verbal
descriptions are used to characterize events and then quantitative interpretations are added.
Benson, Curley, and Smith (1995) suggest that graphic representation is one of the most
used and best developed aids for assessment, with decision trees being the dominant form
of problem representation. However, graphic methods have a limitation in being a weak
account of relevance because they construe relevance as probabilistic dependence. Thus,
graphic representation, like other existing aids, has a limiting account of relevance and
therefore has a tendency to constrain rather than exploit the variety of reasoning strategies
that humans are capable of (Benson et al, 1995). The indirect response mode is generally
the better way to begin encoding because subjects tend to experience difficulty in giving
direct numerical probability (Spetzler & Von Holstein, 1975). Additionally, indirect
assessment avoids the availability heuristic because subjects will not be assessing
probabilities directly based on memory.
Spetzler and Von Holstein (1975) provide an interview process procedure that is
divided into five phases: motivating, structuring, conditioning, encoding, and verifying.
The purpose of the motivating phase is twofold; introduce the subject to the encoding task
at hand and explore the possibility of any motivational biases. The structuring phase is
designed to define the uncertain quantity to be assessed. Wallsten and Budescu (1983)
suggest that when encoding an expert’s (or non-expert) opinion, it is imperative that the
analyst carefully specifies the class of events in question, the sources of information to be
considered, and the potential causes of unreliability in the information (e.g. sampling
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error). The anchoring and adjusting heuristic can play a key role when/if the analyst
accidentally gives undue weight to the earliest information considered. The third phase,
conditioning, is meant to review how the subject assesses probabilities so that any potential
biases can be avoided. The analyst should review the heuristics with the subject so as to
introduce them to how the majority of people process uncertainty and thus attempt to
eliminate the majority of the biases associated with the heuristics. The encoding phase is
exactly that, encoding the uncertain quantity. The suggested route to take is to begin by
asking for the extreme values, use the probability wheel with a new set of values to encode
the corresponding probability levels, plot each response provided on a cumulative
distribution, and use the interval technique to generate the median and quartiles. This
route is suggested to ensure that the biases associated with anchoring and adjusting are
eliminated.
In the final verifying phase the assessment is reviewed and tested for subject
approval. If the subject is not comfortable with the assignments he has provided, the
process may need to be repeated as many times necessary until the subject is confident
with his judgments. A typical interview should last thirty to ninety minutes depending on
the complexity of the situation. Spetzler and Von Holstein (1975) make a final note that
the pre-encoding steps generally take longer than the encoding steps but are the most
essential to good probability assignments. In addition, interactive techniques have proven
to facilitate judgment by minimizing randomness and eliminate unwanted inconsistencies
(Wallsten & Budescu, 1983).
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Keeney and Von Winterfeldt (1991) provided some lessons learned from the
NUREG 1150 study (a study performed by the Nuclear Regulatory Commission to
estimate the uncertainties of accidents in nuclear power plants) and also a recommended
process for eliciting probabilities from experts. The recommended process for eliciting
probabilities from experts consists of seven components: identification and selection of the
issues; identification and selection of the experts; discussion and refinement of the issues;
training for elicitation; elicitation; analysis, aggregation, and resolution of disagreements;
and documentation and communication.
The identification and selection of issues component emphasizes that even before
the study begins, it is important to recognize all uncertainties that need expert probability
elicitation and select the ones that need to go through a formal elicitation procedure. The
second component, identification and selection of experts, is crucial and should involve
both specialists and analysts. Specialists should be the most knowledgeable in their field of
study and the analysts who perform the elicitation should have expertise in probability
theory, statistics and decision analysis. The third component, the discussion and
refinement of the issues, should be conducted in a meeting of the specialists and analysts.
The intent of this first meeting is to ensure that the specialists understand the project and
what is expected of them and to arrive at unambiguous definitions of the events and the
uncertainties that will be elicited. The in depth definition discussion amongst experts
should help to eliminate biases associated with the representative heuristic with the
elimination of any ambiguity.
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After the first meeting is completed, the issues are clarified, and the specialists are
given some time to think about the issues at hand, the training for elicitation should be
conducted. It is suggested that the training be performed by an analyst with intent to
familiarize the specialist with the techniques used in elicitation, provide them with an
assessment practice session, inform them of the potential biases that can occur, and
motivate them on their judging task at hand. Wallsten and Budescu (1983) determined that
the accuracy of the assessments determined by either direct or indirect methods can be
increased with just simple and short training procedures.
Keeney and Von Winterfeldt (1991) proclaim that the elicitation process, the fourth
component, is an interview between the specialist and analyst with a possible generalist
assistant who provides project inputs and recording services. The interview should start
with an informal discussion of the specialist’s approach to the issue and review of the
event definitions in order to map out the decomposition to identify the necessary
judgments. Next, a series of easy questions should be asked to determine the probabilities
or probability distributions of the decomposition, followed by harder questions.
Consistency checks should be administered once the judged probabilities are obtained. The
endpoints or boundaries are next defined, followed by the fractiles with assessing the
median judgment first. The determination of endpoints first helps to eliminate any
anchoring that might occur on behalf of the specialist. A graphical depiction should be
maintained throughout the entire process with continuous consistency checks.
The next step in Keeney and Von Winterfeldt’s overall process is the analysis,
aggregation, and resolution of disagreements component. It is not always feasible to
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combine the specialist’s judgments during the elicitation process, thus the analyses should
be provided to the specialist as soon as possible after the interview so that any necessary
changes can be made while the interview is still fresh in mind. Aggregation across the
experts is then performed by an averaging process with the addition of a sensitivity
analysis. A final group meeting can be held for all specialists and analysts involved to
establish any agreements or disagreements on the probabilities elicited or events in
question.
The final component, documentation and communication, is actually performed
throughout the entire elicitation procedure. At the very minimum, documentation of
elicitation results and reasoning, event definitions, expert identification and selection, the
training session, the actual elicitation session, and the aggregation and analysis should be
maintained.
Mellers and Locke (2007) have additional suggestions for the elicitation procedures
to eliminate biases. The first concerns disclosure, which is a common procedure for
constraining self interest and is based on the assumption that when a subject reveals of a
conflict of interest he will provide a less biased assessment or the analyst will discount the
assessment and thus result in an unbiased decision. A study performed by Cain et al
(2005), however suggested that disclosure actually increased the subject’s bias but also
increased the analyst’s discount, but not enough to correct the initial increase in bias.
Mellers and Locke (2007) believe the reasoning behind this to be that subjects may feel
that if their self interests are disclosed they are less liable to recipients and decision makers
should rely more heavily on their own information without knowing how much the conflict
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of interest has affected the provided assessment. In real life, if the decision maker trusts the
subject providing the assessment and the decision maker is unsure of his own information,
having a provided disclosure may allow the interpretation that the subject’s information is
more credible.
Another suggestion from Mellers and Locke (2007) for the elimination of biases
during the elicitation procedure is to apply accountability to the situation, because predecision accountability to an unknown audience can reduce cognitive biases especially
those biases resulting from lack of effort of understating one’s own judgmental processes.
This suggestion can however have a null or detrimental effect if the decision maker hedges
his choice by sticking with the status quo. For the last suggestion, Mellers and Locke
(2007) state that some tasks, such as recall of items and the effects of anchoring and
adjusting, showed improved performance with the use of incentives. Incentives can
however be harmful if the task is too complicated and most studies actually showed little
effect on performance with the use of incentives.
Clemen and Reilly (2001) identify three basic methods for assessing discrete
probabilities. The first method is to simply ask the decision maker what the probability of
the event’s occurrence is. The problem with this method is the lack of confidence that the
assessor will undoubtedly have in their answer. The second method is to question the
decision maker about any bets they would be willing to place on the event’s occurrence.
The notion behind this method is to find a specific value to win or lose such that the
decision maker is indifferent about which bet to take. The example provided for this
method is centered on an NBA championship game between the Lakers and Pistons. The
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value of interest is the decision maker’s probability that the Lakers will win the game. The
decision maker is willing to take either of the following two bets: Bet 1, Win $X if the
Lakers win or Lose $Y if the Lakers lose; and Bet 2, Lose $X if the Lakers win or Win $Y
if the Lakers lose. Figure 4.1, provided
by Clemen and Reilly (2001, p.300), is
the decision tree that represents what the
decision maker faces. As you can see by
the decision tree this is a V-method
because the value is being modified until
an indifference point between the bets is determined. With some simple reductions, the
subjective probability for the decision maker that the Lakers will win can be represented by
the equation: P ( La ker sWin ) =

Y
. Thus, if a friend was willing to take either side of
X +Y

the bet: Win $2.50 if the Lakers win or Lose $3.80 if the Lakers lose, his subjective
probability would be 3.80/(2.50+3.80) = 0.063 (Clemen & Reilly, 2001).
Clemen and Reilly (2001) explain that the method to finding a bet that a decision
maker is willing to take either side of is fairly basic. The first step is to offer a bet that is
highly favorable to one side or another and make note of which side the decision maker
chooses. Next, offer a bet that heavily favors the other side and ask which side is now
preferable. Continue this process of offering bets back and forth that favor each side and
adjust the payoffs gradually as you persist. By adjusting the bet to be either more or less
attractive based on the previous bet each time, the indifference point can be reached. This
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method of starting with extremes and working inward avoids anchoring, assuming that the
starting points are extreme enough to bound the possible values. This process nonetheless
may not avoid the framing bias because the prizes are variable and one frame could look
better than the other even though they are the same situation based on the same outcome.
The betting approach also has related problems; most people are risk averse and don’t like
the idea of betting and this approach presumes that the individual cannot protect himself
from losses by “hedging” one bet with another. Yet, because this approach does not permit
protection by “hedging” the conservatism bias should be avoided.
The third method for assessing discrete probabilities is to have the decision maker
compare two lotterylike games, either of which can result in a Prize (A or B) (Clemen &
Reilly, 2001). This method is easiest if the prize structure is set up so that the decision
maker prefers Prize A (e.g. a free vacation in Hawaii) to Prize B (e.g. a free beer). This
method is representative of the P-method because the values (prizes) are fixed and the
point is to obtain the associated probabilities. Clemen and Reilly continue their prior
example concerning the NBA championship game between the Lakers and the Pistons with
this method. For this method, the
analyst would ask the decision maker
to compare the lottery, Win Prize A if
the Lakers win or Win Prize B if the
Lakers lose, with the second
‘reference lottery’, Win Prize A with
known probability p or Win Prize B with probability 1-p. Figure 4.2, provided by Clemen
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and Reilly (2001, p.302), is the decision tree representation for this decision. The
probability mechanism must be well specified for the reference lottery and can be as
simple as drawing a colored ball from an urn with proportion p of colored balls or using a
“wheel of fortune,” with a win section and a pointer that provides the decision maker with
Prize A when it lands in the win section. Once an understood mechanism is in place, the
analyst adjusts the probability of winning in the reference lottery until the decision maker
reaches indifference between the two lotteries. The subjective probability that the Lakers
win must be the p that makes the decision maker indifferent, meaning that the decision
maker has no preference between the two lotteries and slightly changing the probability p
makes one or the other clearly preferable.
Clemen and Reilly define a method for obtaining the p that makes the decision
maker indifferent between the two lotteries. Start with some probability p1 and question
which lottery is preferred. If the reference lottery is preferred, then p1 must be too high, so
choose a p2 less than p1 and ask for the preference again. Continue this process of adjusting
the probability in the reference lottery and questioning preferences until the indifference
point is found. An analyst should start with exceptionally wide brackets and converge on
the indifference point slowly, allowing time for the decision maker to deliberate about the
assessment and thus avoiding anchoring. Additionally, because the prizes are fixed in this
method, framing effects can also be avoided. There are still problems even with this
approach to probability assessment. Some people don’t like the idea of lottery game and
others have difficulty understanding a hypothetical game and thus have problems
providing realistic assessments.
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The last step in the discrete probability assessing process for all three methods is to
check for consistency. It is important that the probabilities be consistent amongst
themselves and the assessed probabilities should also obey all probability laws;
probabilities must lie between zero and one, probabilities must add up, and total
probability must equal one (Clemen & Reilly, 2001). If the set of assessed probabilities is
found to be inconsistent, the decision maker should reconsider and make modifications
where necessary.
Clemen and Reilly (2001) also discuss two methods for assessing a subjective
continuous probability. The first strategy is to assess the probability for a few values, plot
them, and then draw a smooth curve through the points. Thus, one must select a few values
from the horizontal axis and then assess the corresponding cumulative probabilities. The
example provided for consideration is deriving a probability distribution to represent the
uncertainty of a movie star’s age. A typical cumulative assessment would be represented
by P(Age ≤ a), where a is the particular value. So if the subject were to consider P(Age ≤
46), the decision maker could use
any of the three methods previously
provided for assessing discrete
probabilities to find the probability p
that would make them indifferent
between the lotteries. Figure 4.3,
provided by Clemen and Reilly
(2001, p.304), is the decision tree representation of this problem.
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The second strategy for assessing the cumulative distribution function is to reverse
the method and pick a few cumulative probabilities from the vertical axis and assess the
corresponding ages. An example for this method is the supposition that the decision maker
wants to assess a corresponding value for the probability 0.35. Consequently, a0.35 is
called the 0.35 distribution fractile. By using what was assessed; P(Age ≤ 29) = 0.00,
P(Age ≤ 40) = 0.05, P(Age ≤ 44) = 0.50, P(Age ≤ 50) = 0.85, and P(Age ≤ 65) = 1.00, it
can determined that the 0.35 fractile of the distribution is approximately 42 years. The
general term fractile includes the median (the 0.50 fractile), quartiles (the 0.25 and 0.75
fractiles), and even the percentiles (the 0.10 fractile is the 10th percentile) of the
distribution. After eliciting the values for each of these fractiles, the points should be
plotted on a graph and a smooth line should be drawn through the points (Clemen &
Reilly, 2001).
A situation of discontent is the argument of using verbal assessment (i.e. using
descriptive words such as most likely, fairly, least likely, etc.) versus numerical and the
notion that most people would prefer verbal estimates because they convey their opinions
more accurately. Wallsten, Budescu, and Zwick (1993) remind us that people, generally
speaking when making a decision, prefer to communicate verbally and receive information
numerically. In addition, Wallsten et al determined that the overall quality of decisions
made from verbal probability assessment was not different than those made with numerical
probability assessment aside from differences in their patterns. Wallsten et al (1993)
propose that if a verbal probability elicitation is to be performed, the analyst should
provide a fixed list of approximately eleven to fifteen words and those words should be
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assigned numerical values by the subject. A main difference between the two methods
(verbal vs. numerical), as determined by Wallsten et al (1993) in their experiment, is that
while overconfidence was prevalent in both models, the magnitude was greater in the
verbal response method. They recognize that the honesty encouraged by the verbal method
allows the analyst to see that overconfidence is even greater than was apparent when using
the numerical method. The main advantage of verbal encoding is that the forecaster is
more comfortable with their assessments, however numerical encoding provides a higher
level of resolution, thus the trade-off is that the 50% category is more widely used in the
numerical method and overconfidence is greater with the verbal method. Wallsten et al
(1993) suggest that the reasoning behind using the 50% category in the numerical method
is because it is equally defensible regardless of the final outcome and furthermore, the
verbal method, because it allows vagueness, relieves the stress of assessment defense.
The basic steps of proper probability elicitation from an expert – explaining the
problem in depth, training the subject on the cognitive heuristics and their associated
biases, eliciting the probability through an in depth interview process, and verifying the
assessments – will eliminate most biases presented in chapter three. There are however
further steps that can be taken to improve the probabilities because of overconfidence and
other biases that slipped through the cracks during the elicitation process. These
improvement methods are presented in chapter five.
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CHAPTER 5 Improvement of Assessments
This chapter brings to the forefront ways to improve the probabilities elicited,
eliminate some of the biases defined in chapter three that weren’t eliminated by the
elicitation procedures defined in chapter four, and in addition, some potential assessment
practices to avoid them from the very start. This chapter will review the concept of
calibration and its role in the process of probability elicitation. Concerning calibration and
refinement, Wallsten and Budescu (1983) and Liberman and Tversky (1993) provide some
general thoughts on the subject, Harrison (1977) discusses issues with independence and
calibration, Degroot and Fienberg (1983) provide calibration and refinement methods for
evaluating and comparing forecasters, and Keren (1997) reviews some of the problems
associated with calibration. The issue of coherence is discussed by Lindley, Tversky, and
Brown (1979) who tackle the problem on incoherence with two reconciliation approaches
and Lindley (1982) who evaluates whether assessment can be improved by having a better
understanding of the assessment mechanism. Finally, the concept of decomposition is
reviewed by Ravinder, Kleinmuntz, and Dyer (1988) who suggest the decomposition
method for obtaining more reliable subjective probabilities, Howard (1989) who shows us
how knowledge maps that represent decomposition are a convenient process for
representing knowledge and the involved uncertainty, and finally, Moskowitz and Sarin
(1983) who test whether using a judgmental aid will reduce in the number of inconsistent
probability assessments.
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5.1. Calibration and Refinement
A method for attempting to establish the validity of a probability elicitation method or of a
subject is deemed calibration (Wallsten & Budescu, 1983). Calibration is determined by
whether for all events assigned probability p, the proportion that occurs is actually p and it
is therefore an indirect measure of validity. Wallsten and Budescu (1983) also note that
there are training methods that can improve calibration and one method in particular
suggested by Koriat et al. is to have the subjects list reasoning for and against their
assessments which yields improvement because subjects generally fail to consider the
counter-indicants for their decisions. Lastly, Wallsten and Budescu (1983) determined that
experts are generally well calibrated when making assessments in their field of expertise
while non-experts are limited but do show great improvement with training.
Harrison (1977) provides a discussion on the operational issue brought forth by
calibration error and he argues that, “the existence of calibration error does not affect the
theoretical justifications for the subjective view of probability, but does severely restrict
what we can do with subjective assessments” (p.320). Thus, the issue is whether we can
justify independence assumptions with subjectively assessed probabilities. This means that
if a subject learns about the occurrence of an event it will potentially inform him of his
own assessing characteristics and thus might affect the assessment he makes for the other
event. Harrison uses the calibration exercise, which is to select random variables of
unknown quantities, assess the subjective distribution for each, observe the actual value for
each variable, and then compute the calibration curve which plots assessed probability
against observed frequency. The calibration curve should mirror a 45 degree line and if it
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doesn’t, the subject is deemed miscalibrated as an assessor for that particular group of
distributions. Figure 5.1 shows three separate calibration curves: a well calibrated
forecaster, an overconfident forecaster, and an underconfident forecaster. Note the
overconfident forecaster’s curve is representative of his tendency to use values close to the
boundaries instead of values approximate to the median range. The underconfident
forecaster exhibits the exact opposite trend with over-usage of the range of values close to
0.5 and under-usage the extreme values.

Liberman and Tversky (1993) designate two forms of calibration plots, the
designated form, where a target event is pre-selected for each problem and the data are
displayed based on the assigned probabilities to the events with disregard to their
complements, and the inclusive form, where the probabilities assigned to the two
complementary events are incorporated for each problem. The usage for each form differs
in the designated form is generally used when all judgments refer to a common hypothesis
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(e.g. rain vs. no rain, etc.) and the inclusive form is generally used with general knowledge
problems that have no common hypothesis, although the form is not dictated by the
hypotheses under consideration. Liberman and Tversky (1993) note that both the
designated and the inclusive indices can be useful for describing and evaluating probability
assessments but the inclusive analysis is deemed appropriate when there is interest in the
subject’s use of the probability scale, not necessarily the specific outcome, and the
designated analysis is more relevant when there is interest in the specific outcome
prediction.
Harrison (1977) provides an example where a subject is asked for the subjective
probability distributions (Fk) for a series of 1000 numerical almanac quantities (Xk). The
analyst uses the probability wheel elicitation procedure to aid in the probability
assessments by determining the setting of the wheel that makes the subject indifferent
between the lottery L, where a payoff depends on the percentage of the random variables
that actually have values less than or equal to the 30th percentile of the assessed
distribution, and the reference lottery. The analyst then looks up the actual numerical
values for each of the quantities and plots the calibration curve. Now the subject has an
opportunity to view how calibrated he is and determine if it’s a consequence to how
reasonable his axioms are. Harrison notes that the current literature suggests that people
are generally quite badly miscalibrated as probability assessors and the risk of being
miscalibrated averts the subject from treating events as independent. Miscalibration can
occur when a subject anchors to probabilities that are too high or too low, thus the
anchoring and adjusting heuristic is in effect.
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Harrison then provides a statement (*) that the subject might subscribe to
concerning the nature of the perceived dependence among events that would enable some
concrete calculations, since the dependence issue makes computation nearly impossible.
Statement (*) declares that there exists a random variable α, such that E1,…, E1000 (where
events Ek = {Xk ≤ xk}) are conditionally independent given α, with P(Ek| α) = α for all k.
Statement (*) might aid in providing a reasonable approximation to the type of dependence
that the subject feels is in existence, and the degree of dependence is expressed by the
subject’s prior distribution for α. Thus it follows that mean of the distribution is E(α) =
P(Ek) = 0.30. Using this statement, Harrison reviews three problems and in each case P(·)
denotes a probability computed from Statement (*) and the indicated prior distribution for
α, while Q(·) denotes a probability based on the assumption that E1,…, E1000 are
independent.
Harrison’s problem 1 considers a lottery where P gives a wider spread distribution
for K than does Q, and the effect is more pronounced when the outcomes from a larger
number of trials are considered. The problem also provides the option of buying perfect
information as to the value of α before deciding whether or not to play. The option to pay
for information shows whether the subject views himself as miscalibrated, and thus
validates the suggestion that when a subject worries over his potential miscalibration his
assessments are modified. Problem 2 considers a lottery where a severe loss is suffered if
E1,…, E8 all occur and a moderate gain is enjoyed otherwise. The probabilities are
calculated (Q(E1 and … and E8) = (0.30)8 = 6.56×10-5 and P(E1 and … and E8) = E(α8) =
29!16!/8!371 = 3.33×10-4) and the lottery is determined to be unattractive because the
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negative outcome probability is larger by a factor of about five. Harrison notes that the
percentage error caused by an assumption of independence grows rapidly when one
increases the number of events being intersected. This is a situation however, where the
assessor’s uncertainty about his calibration must be accounted for. The third problem lets
K = θ1 + … + θ10 (where θk is an indicator variable that equals 1 if Ek occurs and 0
otherwise) and a lottery L that pays an attractive prize if K = 2, 3, or 4, which are the three
most likely single values for K, but pays nothing otherwise. The probabilities P(win) and
Q(win) are computed to be 0.63 and 0.70 respectively suggesting that once again the
assumption of independence introduces significant error.
Harrison presents De Finetti’s theorem on how a subject must subscribe to
Statement (*) if they believe that the original collection of random variables Xk could be
augmented so that the sequence of events E1, E2,… could be viewed as exchangeable. The
theorem consists of two statements and the first is that there exists a random variable α
such that P{αn → α as n → ∞} = 1, where αn denotes the fraction of the first n events that
occur. Therefore, even though the subject may not actually know the exact value, they are
positive (probability of one) that a limiting frequency will be achieved. The second
statement of De Finettis’ theorem is that the events Ek are conditionally independent given
α, with P(Ek | α) = α. Thus, α is defined as a limiting calibration factor. De Finetti’s
theorem shows that a subject can account for his uncertainty about his calibration through
simple calculations. Overall, Harrison believes that the current professional practice of
probability elicitation using the lottery procedure to reduce a sensitive outcome is what
opens up the possibility of serious error through unwarranted independence assumptions.
52

In addition, the analyst should have some trepidation about the potential effect of a
subject’s uncertainty of his own calibration.
DeGroot and Fienberg (1983) present an article that provides methods for
evaluating and comparing forecasters. They make sure to first differentiate between
calibration and refinement, as these two concepts are used for comparing forecasters. They
define calibration as the “agreement between a forecaster’s predictions and the actual
observed relative frequency of rain” and refinement is specified as “how spread out or how
sharp a forecaster’s predictions are” (DeGroot & Fienberg, 1983 p.13). Thus a forecaster is
well calibrated if ρ(x) = x, where ρ(x) denotes the relative frequency of rain on all the days
that the forecaster’s prediction was x, for every value of x such that v(x) > 0, where v(x) is
the frequency function of the forecaster’s predictions over the days. There are, however, a
few reasons why a forecaster may not be as well calibrated as he would prefer. A
forecaster’s predictions are only observed for a finite number of days and there really is no
reason why his predictions should realistically coincide with the actual occurrence of rain.
Because being well calibrated is a desirable characteristic of forecasting, a forecaster could
be tempted to actually lie and specify predictions that do not represent his true subjective
probabilities in order to attain certain values, thus introducing a motivational bias. Even so,
a forecaster can be well calibrated with his own predictions in the long run, but if they
aren’t accurate on a specific day, they are of no use. While calibration is a desired
characteristic of forecasters, it does not ensure informativeness (Liberman & Tversky,
1993).
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DeGroot and Fienberg’s concept of refinement is used to compare the well
calibrated forecasters. The logical concept for two forecasters who are well calibrated is as
follows: “A is at least as refined as B if we can artificially generate a well-calibrated
forecaster with the same probability function vB(x) as B simply by passing A’s predictions
through a noisy channel” (DeGroot & Fienberg, 1983 p.14). A forecaster who makes the
same prediction each day is least-refined because any other well calibrated forecaster is at
least as refined as he is. And on the other end, the forecaster whose predictions are binary
and always correct is most-refined because he is at least as refined as any other well
calibrated forecaster. It is possible that a comparison exists and it can be possible that two
forecasters are just not comparable in terms of refinement. If this be the case, DeGroot and
Fienberg present a theorem, supplied from their previous work (1982), which eliminates
the need to construct an appropriate stochastic transformation. Theorem 1 considers two
well-calibrated forecasters A and B and states that forecaster A is at least as refined as B if
j −1

and only the following inequalities are satisfied:

∑ (x
i =0

j

− xi ){v A (xi ) − v B ( xi )} ≥ 0 for j=1,

…, k-1. An example provided by DeGroot and Fienberg (1982) is, if A and B are wellcalibrated with the probability functions; vA(x) = {0.1 for x=0, 0.8 for x=0.5, 0.1 for x=1
and vB(x) = {0.5 for x=0.1 and 0.5 for x=0.9, then neither A nor B is at least as refined as
B

the other. The condition provides the reasoning that if “one well calibrated forecaster A is
at least as refined as another well-calibrated forecaster B, and if we must choose between
learning the prediction of A or learning the prediction of B, then we should choose to learn
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the prediction of A regardless of the purposes for which we will use the prediction”
(DeGroot & Fienberg, 1983 p.15).
It is also possible to compare forecasters who are not necessarily well calibrated
with the concept of sufficiency provided by DeGroot and Fienberg (1983). They define
sufficiency as, “A is sufficient for B if we can artificially generate a forecaster with the
same functions vB(x) and ρB(x) as B simply by passing A’s predictions through a noisy
channel” (DeGroot & Fienberg, 1983 p.16). However, when the forecasters are well
calibrated, the sufficiency relationship reduces to the refinement relationship. Just like in
refinement, all forecasters might not be comparable in terms of sufficiency and even if
sufficiency exists it does not automatically assume that one forecaster is as good as the
other. A good example provided is if forecaster A only makes binary predictions and is
always wrong, then he is sufficient for every other forecaster even though he is the worst at
forecasting. However, because he is always wrong, his predictions are just as useful as a
forecaster who is always right. The concept of sufficiency is based on whether we should
choose to learn the prediction of one forecaster versus another. Thus, even if A is sufficient
for B (i.e. we should learn A’s predictions), more information might be obtained if we
were to learn both sets of predictions instead of just A’s. DeGroot and Fienbert (1983)
continue their analysis by using scoring rules to evaluate forecasters with relation to
calibration and refinement. The topic of scoring rules will be covered in chapter 6.
Keren (1997) presents some of the problems associated with the research on
calibration. His first problem is that studies in calibration assume that probabilities are
subjective yet they are evaluated by frequentistic criterion which provides controversy on
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the validity of this procedure. The second problem he brings forth concerns the trade-off
between calibration and resolution, as calibration and resolution are not completely
independent of one another and there may be incompatibility between the requirements for
maximizing calibration and achieving high resolution.
Keren (1997) reviews the framework provided by Juslin et al that states there are
three necessary requirements for being well calibrated: first is cognitive adjustment,
requiring internal probabilities to equal the corresponding ecological probabilities; second
is error free translation, assuming that translation from internal uncertainty to a response
should be free from error; and third is representative design, requiring the “selection of
tasks such that the probabilities of the events in the task sample should coincide with
ecological probabilities” (p.270). Should these assumptions be violated, random error will
be affected and thus reduce the calibration quality. Keren notes that this approach does
adopt a frequentistic interpretation, which in turn makes confidence or probability
assessments of unique events meaningless, thus limiting the scope of studying how people
deal with uncertainty and also overlooking the fact that judgment of uncertainty in
everyday life cannot be justified on frequentistic grounds. Furthermore, Juslin et al
clarifies that the hard-easy effect is inconsistent with the conjunction of the three
assumptions and in continuation, the third assumption is doubted because of studies that
were performed that made an attempt to employ a representative design, subsequently
showed clear overconfidence. Additionally, Keren (1997) provides the error source
applicable to assumption two; internal probabilities are unobservable and therefore cannot
be directly matched to external responses but insight can be obtained from the examination
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of different response scales (e.g. whether the probability scale is half or full range, a choice
or no choice situation, and/or discrete or continuous). Additional research to determine a
clearer notion of the relevant factors is needed. Overall, Keren (1997) suggests that random
error can be affected by more than one factor and “the magnitude of the random error
affects the degree of goodness of calibration indirectly by determining the extent to which
regression toward the mean will be present” (p.272).

5.2. Coherence
The concept of coherence, when an individual’s assessments obey the probability
postulates, is a necessity for assessed subjective probabilities (Clemen & Reilly, 2001).
Wallsten and Budescu (1983) state that there is one axiom for a rational belief structure
that leads to an additive probability measure, representative of a coherent opinion, and one
that doesn’t. An axiom system that doesn’t lead to an additive probability measure is due
to the lack of perfect sensitivity, a feature of human judgment, which is basically the
reality that a subject is not capable of making infinitely fine judgments and therefore they
cannot place order to events that are close in relative likelihood. Lindley, Tversky, and
Brown (1979) explore the reconciliation of assessments that are contradictory to the laws
of probability, or incoherent probability assessments. Some examples of this incoherence
are probability assessments that are not additive or have conditional probability ratios that
do not coincide with the corresponding unconditional probability ratios. They developed
two approaches, an internal and external, to solve the reconciliation problem. “In the
internal approach, the observed probability assessments are related to internal coherent
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probabilities in a manner analogous to the relation between the observed score and the true
score in test theory” (Lindley et al, 1979 p.149). Thus the internal approach is concerned
with attempting to approximate the “true” probabilities using the observed assessments.
The external approach is only concerned with deriving coherent probabilities using the
original set of incoherent assessments instead of addressing any “true” probabilities.
The basic model for both approaches contains: one subject that will be providing
the judgments and is not necessarily coherent (S), an uncertain event under consideration
(A), a probability distribution for A (π(A)), a vector that describes the assessed values
(q(A)), and an investigator who is coherent (N) and is tasked with reconciling the subjects
stated values of the observed measurements (q) and providing an assessment of the true
measurements (π). The investigator is concerned with the true measurements in the internal
approach and the world external to the subject in the external approach. The investigator N
could assess his own probabilities, denoted p(·) and thus provide a joint probability
distribution of the uncertain quantities. The joint probability is described in three stages
with each corresponding to a different aspect of N’s contemplation of the problem; first,
there is a distribution A, p(A), second, there is a conditional distribution of π given A, p(π |
A), and third, there is a conditional distribution of q given the other two elements, p(q | π,
A). Basically, p(A) can be seen as N’s appreciation of the world, p(π | A) as N’s opinion of
S’s knowledge of the world, and p(q | π) as N’s opinion of S as an assessor.
The internal approach provides a complete probabilistic description of q and π
because N is only concerned with π and q: p (π ) = ∑ p(π | A) p( A) , where ∑A is the
A
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summation over a partition of events in A. Using Bayes theorem
provides, p (π | q ) ∝ p (q | π ) p (π ) , which is N’s appraisal of S after S has reported his
assessments q and can be used when the subject has made several incoherent probability
judgments and wishes to reconcile them to coherent values. With the direct form for the
internal approach, i.e. using p(π) and p(q | π) to obtain p(π | q), π is the set of parameters, q
is the data, and the “prior” p(π) is updated by the likelihood p(q | π) to give a posterior
probability p(π | q). The technique of sending the whole argument through with log-odds
instead of probabilities, because the q’s cannot be normally distributed, becomes the most
usable method for reconciliation. This is partly because log-odds are more convenient and
sensible to work with than probabilities. In addition, log-odds are necessary to handle
bivariate distributions and it’s more reasonable to assume that the measurement error has
constant variance when expressed in log-odds. The technique only then requires the
addition of the variances and covariances of q, because they describe the normal
likelihood, and an assumption that the prior is “flat.”
Wallsten and Budescu (1983) have a different belief concerning the true measure of
a subject and thus a different approach for the use of the concept of a true score. Wallsten
and Budescu (1983) explain that their version of a true score incorporates the subject
providing an assessment based on current knowledge and information at hand a large
number of times (with no memory of each previous judgment) and the provided
distribution would define the true score of that subject. Thus the true score t, is the
expected value of the distribution obtained by a series of statistically independent
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assessments made by a subject. So instead of assuming a set of internal subjective
probabilities, they assume that independent probability assessments will provide
distributions with well-defined expected values termed the true subjective probabilities for
that subject, the specific task, and particular situation.
The external approach provides a probabilistic description of q and A because here
N is only concerned with q and A: p (q | A) = ∑ p (q | π ) p(π | A) . Again, using Bayes
π

theorem we obtain p ( A | q ) ∝ p ( q | A) p ( A) , which can be used when the investigator is a
decision maker in need of a probability for A for a decision to be made. The internal
approach is deemed simpler than the external approach because p(π) can be assessed
directly and it does not need to use p(π | A), nor the derived probability p(q | A).
Lindley et al. (1979) also provide a least squares procedure with the internal
approach in which they are only concerned with the subject’s stated and coherent values
for some events, q and π. With this, the reconciled values πˆ i = E (π i | q ) are approximated
by the values of the π’s that minimize ∑ ( qi − π i ) 2 . And in other situations, the q’s will
i

be correlated with different variances, when the quadratic form

∑w

ij

(qi − π i )(q j − π j ) is

minimized subject to the w’s being weights. Minimization is performed by equating the
first derivatives to zero, thus providing the approximate variances and covariances of the
reconciled values from the inverted minimized matrix of second derivatives. The one
difficulty associated with the procedure is that the coherence constraints are typically nonlinear resulting in non-linear equations. There also comes a consideration of a metric (e.g.
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probability metric, log-odds metric, etc.) when using the least squares application because
the variance of the q’s may be more constant in one metric versus another. An alternative
to changing the metric for precision purposes is for either S or N to provide the precision,
“the degree to which it varies upon further reflection”, associated with the values (Lindley
et al, 1979 p.156). For example, the likelihood that that a coin will come up heads is very
precise as it will not likely differ from 0.5.
Lindley (1982) explores the option of better understanding the assessment
mechanism to improve the probability assessments. Lindley first notes that an investigator
(N) is not essential to process the subject’s (S) evaluations as in his previous work, though
having it is not unreasonable. The question asked by Lindley is whether q, the log-odds for
uncertain event A, can be transformed to a better log-odds assessment q*. The subject’s
probability appraisal can be described as, if A( ¯A) is true, let fi(q)[ f0(q)] be the probability
that S will give log-odds q. Thus, for a subject who is excellent at assessing, q will be
positive and large under A, and negative and large under ¯A. The only case however where
N will believe S is when q* = q: which from the log-odds assessment for
A, q* = log[γf1 (q ) /(1 − γ ) f 0 (q)] , is when γf 1( q ) /(1 − γ ) f 0(q ) = e q , or when log-odds (A | q)
= q. Thus, S is probability calibrated, when the frequency and assessed probability agree, if
this occurs. More generally, S is probability calibrated if there is a change from q to q*.
The example provided by Lindley (1982) for this is to let γ = ½ and f1(q) = f0(-q),
so that S is just as likely to say p for the probability of A when A is true, as 1-p for A when
¯A is true, furthermore suppose f1(q) is N(μ,σ2), so that f0(-q) is N(-μ,σ2). Then the
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improved assessment will be the original assessment multiplied by 2μ/σ2,
1
1
q* = − (q − μ ) 2 / σ 2 + (q + μ ) 2 / σ 2 = 2 μq / σ 2 . Now, q* will be N(μ1,σ12) with μ1 =
2
2

2μ2/σ2 and σ12 = 4μ2/σ2 under A, and since 2μ1 /σ12 = 1, so that S is probability calibrated,
the original assessment is only probability calibrated when 2μ = σ2.
Basically, the subject may believe that he has biases (fi(q)) that might affect his
judgments. However, the distributions can be updated once the subject learns the truth
about such events and therefore the basic assessments are improved because the subject
learns about his own prejudices. An advantage of having an investigator, and identifying
him with the subject, is that the idea of an infinite regress is avoided. However, a difficulty
that arises when the subject and investigator are identified is that as soon as the subject
learns about fi(q) he will most likely adjust his assessment procedure. As for changing the
assessment procedure, the subject might continue to assess as before and then transform
the assessments based on the noted bias or he might adjust the actual procedure. An
example provided by Lindley (1982) of these two options is that a surveyor might
recognize a bias in his theodolite (a measuring instrument) but continue to use it and make
corrections to the readings accordingly, just like the previously discussed example where S
transformed to q*, or he might make an adjustment to the actual theodolite.
A connected difficulty in having the investigator separate from the subject is that if
the subject is calibrated for one value of γ, N’s probability for the event, he will not be
calibrated for a different value. This difficulty can be overcome with French’s (1980) idea
that the distributions fi(q) might depend on γ. Lindley’s example for this is the supposition
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that the subject was informed that for a series of almanac type questions the suggested
answers were at random with the upper answer being correct three quarters of the time.
Reasonably, this information should affect the f’s. Therefore, the original log-odds
equation, γf 1( q ) /(1 − γ ) f 0(q ) = e q , would become γf 1( q | γ ) /(1 − γ ) f 0( q | γ ) = e q , and
calibration for all γ would be possible. Lindley supplies an example where
f 1(q | γ ) ~ N ( μ + δ , σ 2 ) and f 0( q | γ ) ~ N ( − μ + δ , σ 2 ) , with δ = log[γ /(1 − γ )] , the initial
log-odds for A. Verifying S to be calibrated for all γ with 2μ = σ2, thus under the same
conditions as before, is fairly easy. Normally, when the subject is asked to assess the
probability for an unknown event, like the almanac questions, it is not described in a way
that would favor its truth or falsity, and γ = ½. However, if the subject feels that the
questioner phrased the event in a way that even though it appears to be true, it is more
likely to be false, a catch is implicated and γ < ½. Lindley proves this suggestion with an
example involving the relative latitude coordinates of places in Europe and North America;
since subjects generally do not realize how far north Europe really is.

5.3. Decomposition
Ravinder, Kleinmuntz, and Dyer (1988) targeted their article around how an analyst can
reduce inconsistency by relying on decomposition rather than direct elicitation by
establishing the impact of the decomposition procedure on the reliability of the assessed
probabilities. Decomposition is the process of breaking down a probability assessment into
smaller or manageable chunks (Clemen & Reilly, 2001). Clemen and Reilly recognize
three different scenarios where decomposition is appropriate: thinking about how the event
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in question is related to other events, thinking about what uncertain outcomes could lead to
the event in question occurring, and/or thinking about what uncertain outcomes must
happen for the event in question to occur. Clemen and Reilly (2001) also state that the best
decomposition to use is the one that is easiest to contemplate and that gives the most
transparent view of the uncertainty in question. Ravinder et al (1988) regard
decomposition as a useful technique for reducing the complexity of challenging judgment
problems. The decomposition approach is able to capture the relationship between the
event in question, the target event, and its background events (e.g. the survivability of a
patient may depend on the disease they had, the strength of the patient, the complexity of
the medical procedure performed, etc.) with conditional probabilities of the target event.
For example, the different distributions of the survivability of the patient just mentioned
could be assessed conditionally upon the outcome of the disease they had, or conditional
upon the occurrence of multiple events (e.g. the disease the patient had was nonsignificant, the complexity of the surgery was minuscule, and the patient’s strength was
favorable). The broken down judgments are later combined using an aggregation rule
based upon statistical considerations, i.e. the law of total probability provides a convenient
method. The example provided by Ravinder et al (1988) is to denote the probability of the
target event as A and assume it is assessed conditional upon its background events B1,…,
Bn. The event Bi can be a single event or a scenario and the set must form a mutually
B

B

exclusive and exhaustive partition of the relevant event space, meaning it must encompass
all possible background events that could/would lead to the target event, and
thus: ∑i =1 Pr( Bi ) = 1 . So the probability of the target event would
n
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n

be: Pr( A) = ∑ Pr( A | Bi ) Pr( Bi ) . Obviously, elicitation by decomposition is more laborious
i =1

than direct assessment, because a marginal and conditional probability must be assessed
for each background event.
Ravinder et al (1988) use the psychometric framework developed by Wallsten and
Budescu (1983) for evaluating the accuracy of probability encoding. The proposed model
is as follows: each encoded probability is considered a random variable, x, composed of a
fixed true measure, t, and a variable error, e, such that x = t + e. There is importance of
noting and maintaining the distinction between random and systematic sources of error
when working with this model, because an analysis of reliability is only concerned with
random errors and does not address errors that are observed to be consistent, predictable
differences in the true scores.
In order to compare decomposition to direct assessment, the probability of the
n

target event can be rewritten as a = ∑ ci bi with the direct assessment, denoted a, the
i =1

components of the decomposition estimate, denoted a’, the conditional probabilities of the
background events, denoted Pr(A|Bi) = ci, and marginal probabilities of the background
events, denoted Pr(Bi) = bi. Now the measurement model can be applied both to the direct
assessment and the decomposition estimate components, such that for the direct
assessment, a' = α '+δ ' , where α’ is the true score and δ’ is the random error with its
standard error of measurement (SEM) denoted by σ0. In addition, marginal probabilities of
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the background events are bi = β i + δ i , with each SEM denoted by σi, and conditional
probabilities of the background events are ci = γ i + ε i , with each SEM denoted by τi.
Ravinder et al (1988) do not accept the additional assumption provided by Wallsten and
Budescu, that random errors are uncorrelated, because they argue that marginal
probabilities cannot be completely independent since they must sum to one to be coherent
and errors in the elicitation of the conditional probabilities could be correlated due to the
anchoring and adjusting heuristic discussed in chapter three. Thus, correlations for the
errors in the marginal elicitations, denoted φij, are accepted in lieu of independence and, in
addition, the errors in the condition elicitations may be correlated, denoted by ρij.
The set of equations previously noted can be used to obtain the expected value and
variance of the decomposition estimate (Ravinder et al, 1988). The expected value of the
n

decomposition estimate, E(a), can be derived from E ( a ) = ∑ E (ci bi ) , and with the
i =1

n

assumption of independence between the errors in the ci and bi terms, E (a ) = ∑ E (γ i β i ) .
i =1

If the estimates of the various probabilities are unbiased, because of the assumption that
the random error terms have expected values of 0, the expected value of the decomposition
estimate (previous equation) should be equal to the expected value of the direct
assessment, earlier equated a’. The decomposition estimate error variance is denoted
by, Var (a ) = σ d2 , and with the help of the adjusted target event equation, the variance can
n

n

n

be rewritten as the sum of a set of covariances, σ d2 = Var (∑ ci bi ) =∑∑ Cov(ci bi , c j b j ) .
i =1
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i =1 j =1

Using the idea that ci and bi terms have independent errors, a general formula for the
decomposition error is produced:
n

n

n

n

n

n

σ d2 = ∑∑ (γ iσ i )(γ j σ j )ϕ ij + ∑∑ ( β iτ i )(β jτ j )ρ ij + ∑∑ (σ iτ i )(σ jτ j )ϕ ij ρ ij .
i =1 j =1

i =1 j =1

i =1 j =1

Ravinder et al address the question of the relative sizes of the errors associated with
direct elicitation and decomposition with a comparison of the SEM of direct elicitation to
the SEM of decomposition. The percent change due to decomposition,
denoted: π =

σd −σ0 σ d
=
− 1 , can express the relative size of the measurement errors. If
σ0
σ0

π = 0, then there are identical levels of measurement error for both techniques. If a
negative value is produced, there is an improvement due to decomposition, and a positive
value indicates that “decomposition is inferior to direct assessment” (Ravinder et al, 1988
p.195). Deriving upper and lower bounds for π can be extremely informative when
comparing the amount of error associated with each technique. In general, decomposition
can considerably reduce the potential error, especially if the component probabilities can
be more precisely assessed than the target event (direct assessment).
Ravinder et al (1988) conclude with some recommendations about structuring
probability encoding tasks that will minimize inconsistency: decomposition can reduce
random errors associated with probability encodings; error reduction has an upward limit
and assessing additional probabilities will not be necessary to obtain further reduction; the
conditioning events marginal probabilities should be selected to be equal; conditional
probabilities that cover an extremely wide range of values should be avoided; the
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component probability assessment errors should be as small as possible; and the analyst
should try to maintain independence of the component assessments. Finally, a
decomposition approach is simple (conceptually), is implemented easily, and apparently
has great potential for error reduction.
Howard (1989) continues with the idea of decomposition in his work. He notes
that information is generally received fragmentally by an analyst when it comes from an
expert or a group of experts, and the daunting task of gathering and coordinating these
fragments can be lessened with the use of knowledge maps. A knowledge map is centered
on the concept of influence diagrams and captures the relevant knowledge of an event. An
influence diagram represents the actions a decision maker may take and the information
possessed at the time of the decision by way of decision nodes (boxes representing an
action to be taken), chance nodes (circles representing an uncertain event), and arrows
(showing connectivity between the events). A knowledge map is also another method for
decomposing a complex uncertain event into workable and more easily understood units.
Howard (1989) uses the Tversky and Kahneman (1973) study of Tom W. to prove
his point on how knowledge maps (decomposition) can aid in correcting the representative
heuristic. As previously reviewed in chapter two, the Tom W. study presents a high school
description of Tom implying that he is introverted, mechanically minded, lacking in
creativity, and well organized to a group of students who are supposed to assess the
likelihood that Tom would be enrolled in a specific field of graduate study. Generally, the
assessors relate Tom to being a “nerd” and subsequently place him into the field of
computer science or engineering without regard to the relative enrollment populations of
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each field of study. Howard (1989) first suggests decomposing this problem into assessing
the likelihood that a student would be in each field of study and the likelihood of having a
report such as Tom’s given he is in each field of study. Next the assessors are to multiply
the two likelihoods together and then normalize to yield a posterior distribution on the
different fields. This first step provides an improvement step in understanding but still does
not capture all that is relevant to the second probability, that a report like Tom’s would be
in a given field. Howard believes that the remaining relevant information can be captured
with three considerations: is Tom’s personality now different than in high school (when the
report was completed), are there any validity issues with the report itself, and is personality
a good indicator of field of study. Figure 5.2, provided by Howard (1989, p.912), is the
corresponding knowledge map that captures these three considerations.

Despite the fact that this knowledge map encompasses all the necessary
information for determining the likelihood, it does not reflect the notion that an individual
might not feel comfortable trying to assess the relevance of present personality to graduate
field because they do not think about characterizing the personalities of graduate students.
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Yet assessing the probability distribution on field of study and what is known about the
personalities of graduate students in each field is probably more comfortable for most
assessors, because people do think of graduate students by field. Thus, the redundancy map
in Figure 5.3, provided by Howard (1989, p.913), is created to represent this more

comfortable way of thinking. The assessments for the original knowledge map (figure 5.2)
can now be determined by using the new assessments from figure 5.3 iteratively until the
Personality Now distributions agree and then performing the Bayesian reversal of the
arrow from Graduate Field to Personality Now.
“A knowledge map represents a possible assessment order for the joint distribution
on the uncertain quantities (events) it contains”, and in some instances the decision maker
is only interested in the joint distribution of a few of the events (Howard, 1989 p.918). For
these such instances constructing a disjoint knowledge map can simplify the assessment.
The corresponding example provided by Howard (1989) is for a subject to be interested in
assessing a probability distribution on the income of the next person to enter the room. To
aid in thinking about this particular assessment, the subject might want to consider the
amount of education the person has had and even the age of the individual. With these
additional events however comes additional assessments and the subject is only interested
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in the distribution on income, thus the subject
would want to draw the corresponding
disjoint knowledge map represented in figure
5.4, provided by Howard (1989, p.920). The
subject can now assess a distribution on age
and another on education given age, multiply
them, and then sum age to obtain a
distribution on education. Finally, the desired distribution on income can be obtained by
substituting this distribution into the equation for deriving education (point of large
arrow), {e | &} = ∫ {e | a&}{a | &} , multiplying by an assessed distribution on income given
a

education, and summing over education. As Howard suggests, creating disjoint knowledge
maps can reduce the difficult task of assessment to manageable pieces. One problem with
disjoint knowledge maps however, is that they only represent one point in the spectrum
and they do not provide all the consistency checks and inferences of a complete knowledge
map. Yet overall, knowledge maps permit assessing beyond direct assessment, and the use
of redundant and disjoint knowledge maps “can often reconcile the needs of consistency
and convenience” (Howard, 1989 p.921).
Moskowitz and Sarin (1983) are more focused on the elicitation and additional
problems associated with the elicitation of conditional probabilities instead of marginal
probabilities because the elicitation of conditional probabilities presents extra problems
that are not encountered in marginal probability assessment. In their article, they present
these difficulties (produced due to the heuristics described in chapter 3) and provide
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suggestions for improvement in the assessment procedure such as the introduction of a
judgmental aid. They suggest that these additional assessment difficulties are affected by
the causal versus diagnostic and positive versus negative relationships of the assessed
events. It was determined that the probability judgments are larger if the relationship is
perceived to be causal, in assessing p(B | A), A is perceived as the cause of the occurrence
or nonoccurrence of event B, rather than diagnostic, if B is perceived as the cause of A.
This is because individuals perceive a causal relation as more informative. In addition, a
positive relationship, the knowledge of A occurring should increase the probability of B
occurring, between the events led to larger conditional probability assignments than a
negative relationship because subjects also felt that a positive relation was more
informative. Normatively speaking however, neither the causality/diagnostic relationship
nor the positive/negative relationship should influence the conditional probability
assignments. These effects are noted in the study reviewed below.
Moskowitz and Sarin (1983) performed a case study in which each subject, an
undergraduate enrolled in managerial statistics with a knowledge of the concept
probabilities, assumed the role of a bank lending officer who was given the base rate
probabilities of delinquency, p(D), good or bad credit probabilities p(G) and p(B)
respectively, and was to assess the conditional probabilities p(D|B), p(B|D), and p(D|G).
The subjects first specified their perceptions of the relationship strengths between
delinquency and credit rating on a scale, they then assessed conditional probabilities for 15
questions partitioned into 5 groupings with reasoning as to how they arrived at their
assessments, the subjects were then given a Joint Probability Table (JPT) with the marginal
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event probabilities included as an assessment aid, with which the subjects reassessed
several of the previous questions, and finally they rated the JPT as an assessment aid on a
scale with descriptions as to how it helped.
Each group’s questions were designed to test the consistency with respect to the
probability axioms that must be satisfied for a conditional probability, say p(B | A):
p ( B | A) ≤ 1 , p ( B | A) ≤

p( B)
p( B) + p( A) − 1
, and p ( B | A) ≥ 0 . The results
, p( B | A) ≥
p ( A)
p( A)

showed that a number of violations were observed with possible causes being that the
subjects ignored the based rate frequency of the events (the base rate bias) and the causal
versus diagnostic and positive versus negative relationships. For this study, where the
event of interest is delinquency D, if the event B is bad credit rating then the event B is a
causal datum, and conversely, the event B is a diagnostic datum if D is perceived as the
cause of B. Thus, if B → D and p(D) = Cp(B), then p(D|B) > Cp(B|D), where “→” denotes
the direction of causality, C is a constant, and p(D|B) and p(B|D) are assessed directly.
Once again, the causal relationship led to more revisions and higher conditional
assessments than did the diagnostic and there shouldn’t be a difference. For this study, a
positive relationship between events B and D implies that knowledge of B should increase
the probability of D occurring and therefore p ( D | B) >

p( D) − p( D | G ) p (G )
, where G
p( B)

denotes a good credit rating, and p(D|B) and p(D|G) are directly assessed probabilities.
With the addition of the JPT, the subjects tended to have more confidence in the
marginal probability assessments and were more likely to revise their conditional
probability assessments. The results from the study suggested that the use of the JPT
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drastically improved the consistency, reduced the frequency of the violations of the
conditions, and also lessened the effects of the causality/diagnostic and positive/negative
relationships. However, if the JPT is not used properly, the conditional probabilities can be
inconsistent. Generally though, the subjects indicated that the JPT was in fact a useful tool.
In addition, Moskowitz and Sarin (1983) prove that the task of assessing higher
order probabilities can be thwarted by appropriate bounding. They suggest that the
assessments of marginal and pairwise conditional probabilities are sufficient because they
alone place a very tight bound on the scenario probabilities. However, if they do not
provide a tight enough bound and further precision on the estimation of the scenario
probabilities is needed, higher order probabilities must be assessed. The example provided
by Moskowitz and Sarin is the consideration of n binary events, e1, e2,…, en, thus there
exists N = 2n combinations of occurrence or nonoccurrence, and the assessment of
probabilities would require N – 1 judgments from an expert. If only the marginal and
pairwise conditional probabilities are known, then the lower and upper bounds of the
probabilities can be induced by the linear programs: Min xi s.t. x ∈ X and Max xi
s.t. x ∈ X respectively where only pi and pij = p(ei / ej) · pi for i = 1 to n, j > i, are specified.
One basic possible alternative for this formula is that with simple modification, the bounds
on a subset of scenarios can be easily determined. The results of one simulation study
indicated that only having only the marginal and pairwise conditional probabilities may be
sufficient in many applications. However, in some situations the marginal and pairwise
conditional probabilities may not provide tight enough bounds and higher order
probabilities will need to be assessed, meaning, in the constraint set X the pijk’s will need to
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be assessed. The example provided is the consideration of a 3 event case, p123, where the
bounds are obtained by solving eight equations in the constraint set X and by restricting
each xi ≥ 0. The bounds that facilitate the assessment of higher order probabilities are:
p123 ≤ p12 , p13 , p 23 ,1 − ( p1 + p 2 + p3 ) + ( p12 + p13 + p 23 ) ,
p123 ≥ ( p12 + p13 − p1 ), ( p12 + p 23 − p 2 ), ( p13 + p 23 − p3 ),0 , so that if p1 = 0.5, p2 = 0.2, p3
= 0.9, p12 = 0.1, p13 = 0.45, and p23 = 0.18, then 0.08 ≤ p123 ≤ 0.1. “The mean values of the
bounds in the simulation study were considerably smaller because the bounds decrease
rapidly with the variations in pi’s and pij’s” (Moskowitz & Sarin, 1983 p.747).
These were only some of the methods used to improve assessments provided by
experts during probability elicitation for decision analysis. The subsequent chapter will
review scoring rules, which is a method used to encourage honesty from subjects who are
providing assessments.
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CHAPTER 6 Scoring Rules
This chapter will review the concepts of scoring rules and how they can be applied
to encourage more accurate and honest forecasting. Most of the literature uses weather
forecasting as their research for measuring improvement with these methods. Matheson
and Winkler (1976) will provide the methods used for scoring discrete and continuous
probability distributions. A continuation of the subject involving utilities is presented by
Kadane and Winkler (1988). The use of asymmetric scoring rules (versus symmetric) is
described in detail by Winkler (1994). The use of scoring rules in coordination with
incentive plans for big business is provided by Sarin and Winkler (1980). And finally,
Lichtendahl and Winkler (2007) show how competition between forecasters provides
different uses of scoring rules.
Scoring rules are put in place to encourage a subject to reveal his true opinion and
thus make his probability assessments correspond with his judgment (Matheson &
Winkler, 1976). Scoring rules can be used to either evaluate the assessor by measuring the
goodness of the assessments (an ex post sense), or aid in the elicitation process by
encouraging the assessor to be careful in making assessments (an ex ante sense). Scoring
rules typically are set to overcome motivational biases, anchoring, and overconfidence.
Matheson and Winkler (1976) explain how to perform the generation of a scoring
rule for a binary probability assessment. Consider the event E and a subject who assigns
probability p to the occurrence of the event, but when asked to reveal his assessment
provides a probability r which may not be equal to p. A scoring rule S(r) provides the
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subject a payoff S(r) = S1(r) if the event occurs and S(r) = S2(r) if the event does not occur.
Thus the subject’s expected payoff for the binary situation is

E ( S (r )) = pS1 (r ) + (1 − p) S 2 (r ) and the scoring rule is strictly proper if E(S(p)) > E(S(r))
for r ≠ p. So for a subject to maximize the expected score, the reported forecast r should be
equal to the probability p, meaning the subject should be honest in his reporting (Winkler,
1994).
Averages can be determined when using scoring rules to perform ex post
evaluations (versus using them during the elicitation process to promote honesty)
(Winkler, 1994). Winkler explains that over a series of assessments procedures with the
same value r given as the forecast, the average score is S f (r ) = fS1 (r ) + (1 − f ) S 2 (r )
where f is the relative frequency of E on those occasions and is strictly proper if

S f ( f ) > S f (r ) for r ≠ f . “That is, over the set of occasions with forecast value r,
S f (r ) is maximized when the probability forecast r equals the relative frequency f” and
when f = r, the forecaster is perfectly calibrated (Winkler, 1994 p.1396). As a result for
forecasters who are well calibrated the equation can be simplified to
S (r ) = rS1 (r ) + (1 − r ) S 2 (r ) . Sharpness in probabilities is rewarded with strictly proper
scoring rules and almost all scoring rules used in practice are symmetric in the sense that

S1 (r ) = S 2 (1 − r ) for all r ∈ [0,1] . This implies that S (r ) is symmetric with a minimum
value when r = ½ and a maximum value when r = 0 or 1, and for that reason the average
scores are smallest for forecasts around ½ and biggest for forecasts around 0 or 1, and
thereby gratifying greater sharpness through higher average scores. For the instance when
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the same value of r is not given over different occasions, g(r) denotes the proportion of
occasions that the value r is used in a series of forecasts and f(r) denotes the relative
frequency of occurrence of the event on the occasions for which a forecast of r is given and
thus the overall average score is now
S = ∑ S f ( r ) (r ) g (r ) = ∑ { f (r ) S1 (r ) + [1 − f (r )]S 2 (r )}g (r ) . Now for f(r) = r for all r, or
r

r

perfect calibration, S = ∑ [1 − r (1 − r )]g (r ) and sharpness is again rewarded via S because
r

a distribution g of forecasts r with values of r close to 0 or 1 given more often and values
close to ½ not given as much will yield a higher average score.
Scoring rules can also be generalized to any discrete probability distribution
(Matheson & Winkler, 1976). To do so, let Ei represent the ith event (or ith value of a
random variable), where i ∈ I and I is finite or countably infinite. Also, let pi and ri
correspond to previous p and r in the binary situation, and lastly suppose S(r1, r2, …)
provides the subject’s payoff Sj(r1, r2, …) if Ej occurs.
Then, E ( S ( r1 , r2 ,...)) = ∑ p j S j (r1 , r2 ,...) , and S is strictly proper if
j∈I

E ( S ( p1 , p 2 ,...)) > E ( S (r1 , r2 ,...)) when ri ≠ pi for any i ∈ I .
There are several forms of strictly proper scoring rules that have been developed
and the three most encountered examples are the quadratic, S j (r1 , r2 ,...) = 2r j − ∑ ri 2 , the
i∈I

logarithmic, S j (r1 , r2 ,...) = log r j , and the spherical, S j (r1 , r2 ,...) = r j /(∑ ri 2 )1 / 2 scoring
i∈I

rules. Matheson and Winkler (1976) note that scoring rules can easily be extended to a
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continuous state by limiting arguments. Thus, if x is the value of the variable of interest
and r(x) is the density function assessed by the subject, the continuous quadratic function
∞

is S (r ( x)) = 2r ( x) − ∫ r 2 ( x)dx , the logarithmic functions is S ( r ( x )) = log r ( x ) , and the
−∞

∞

spherical function is S (r ( x)) = r ( x) /( ∫ r 2 ( x)dx)1 / 2 .
−∞

The Brier score is an example of a quadratic scoring rule that is used to evaluate
probabilistic weather forecasts (Winkler, 1994). If considering the quadratic rule
S1 (r ) = 1 − (1 − r ) 2 and S 2 (r ) = 1 − r 2 , the average score is expressed as

S f (r ) = 1 − f (1 − f ) − (r − f ) 2 with the last term rewarding calibration by penalizing
deviations from perfect calibration. For perfect calibrated forecasters the average score
would then be S (r ) = 1 − r (1 − r ) , with the last term penalizing assessments that move from
0 or 1 towards ½ and thereby rewarding sharpness. For the instance when the same value
of r is not given over different occasions, g(r) denotes the proportion of occasions that the
value r is used in a series of forecasts and f(r) denotes the relative frequency of occurrence
of the event on the occasions for which a forecast of r is given and thus the overall
quadratic average score is now S = ∑ {1 − f (r )[1 − f (r )] − [r − f (r )]2 }g (r ) . Now for f(r) =
r

r for all r, or perfect calibration, S = ∑ [1 − r (1 − r )]g (r ) .
r

Kadane and Winkler (1988) are focused on the separation of probability elicitation
from utilities and they review three elicitation procedures, one of which is the use of
scoring rules. Kadane and Winkler focus on an event A, with g ( f | A) and
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g ( f | A ) representing the probability distributions of the expert’s fortune given A and it’s
complement A , with U denoting the expert’s utility function for his or her fortune. Kadane
and Winkler (1988) also present the no-stakes condition which is built upon the instance
when no part of the expert’s fortune is contingent on whether A occurs or not, thus a
condition where c = 1 meaning, g ( f | A) = g ( f | A ) for all f. “Independence of f and the
events or variables for which probabilities are being elicited can be thought of in terms of
the expert having no stakes in these events or variables other than stakes that might be
created as part of the elicitation process through lotteries or other devices” (Kadane &
Winkler, 1988 p.358).
The scoring rule elicitation method is the second method to be reviewed by Kadane
and Winkler, who tell us that the expert will receive a payoff equal to a score S from a
scoring rule that is strictly proper if and only if the reported value is exactly the expert’s
probability, denoted π. They use the quadratic strictly proper scoring rule, S = − r ( x − p ) 2 ,
where p is the expert’s stated probability of A, r is a positive constant, and x is an indicator
variable corresponding to the occurrence (x=1) or nonoccurrence (x=0) of A. The expert’s
expected utility as a function of p would therefore be:
EU ( p ) = π ∫ U [ f − r (1 − p ) 2 ]g ( f | A) df + (1 − π ) ∫ U ( f − rp 2 ) g ( f | A ) df . The expert

would then set the derivative of EU(p), with respect to p, equal to 0 to maximize the
expected utility. Thus,

π (1 − p ) ∫ U '[ f − r (1 − p ) 2 ] g ( f | A) df + (1 − π ) p ∫ U ' ( f − rp 2 ) g ( f | A )df = 0 would
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∫ U '[ f − r (1 − p) ]g ( f | A)df . Now if c = 1,
p /(1 − p ) = cπ /(1 − π ) with c =
∫ U ' ( f − rp ) g ( f | A )df
2

simplify to

2

meaning U is linear, then the expert’s stated probability p will equal π. However, without
linearity, such as for a risk averse individual whose U’ is strictly decreasing, the no stakes
condition will not be sufficient for c = 1 with scoring rules. Consequently, a risk averse
subject who satisfies g ( f | A) = g ( f | A ) will have c < 1 when π > ½ and c > 1 when π < ½
resulting in p moving away from π toward ½. And for a risk seeking subject, the movement
would be in the opposite direction, moving toward 0 when π < ½ and toward 1 when π > ½
with the possibility of moving all the way to p = 0 or 1 for extremists.
When the payoff from the scoring rule is of little consequence or when r
approaches 0, the no-stakes condition is sufficient for c = 1 to hold approximately. The
limit, lim c = c0 =
r →0

∫ U ' ( f ) g ( f | A)df , will equal 1 if the no-stakes condition holds.
∫ U ' ( f ) g ( f | A )df

Expanding c in a Taylor series in r around 0, Kadane and Winkler (1988) find that
c = c 0 + rc1 + O ( r 2 ) , where

⎡
∫ U " ( f ) g ( f | A)df + p 2 ∫ U " ( f ) g ( f | A)df
c1 = ⎢c 0 − (1 − p ) 2
⎢
∫ U ' ( f ) g ( f | A )df
∫ U ' ( f ) g ( f | A )df
⎣

⎤
⎥ . Therefore from these two
⎥
⎦

equations, c = c0 {1 + r[(1 − p) 2 E hA ( w) − p 2 E hA ( w)]} + O(r 2 ) , with
w( f ) = −U " ( f ) / U ' ( f ) , h A ( f ) = U ' ( f ) g ( f | A) / ∫ U ' ( f ) g ( f | A) df , and

h A ( f ) = U ' ( f ) g ( f | A ) / ∫ U ' ( f ) g ( f | A ) df . When U is exponential with w( f ) = w > 0 ,
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c = c 0 [1 + r (1 − 2 p ) w] + O ( r 2 ) and when r is small, c > c0 if π < ½ and c < c0 if π > ½.

Thus, the no-stakes condition by itself is not sufficient for c = 1 making it necessary to
have stronger assumptions for obtainment. In addition, c can differ substantially from 1 if
the no-stakes condition is not satisfied.
Winkler (1994) presents an argument that symmetric rules aren’t always an
appropriate reward structure and he then presents a set of tailor-able asymmetric rules.
When comparing forecasters the scores obtained are meant to compare the skill of the
forecaster but instead they also depend on the current situation the forecaster is in. For
example, forecasters who are located in very dry climates can be very refined because they
can give precipitation predictions close to zero on multiple days, whereas a forecaster
located in an area with a higher annual rainfall or unpredictable weather patterns may not
be able to predict precipitation likelihood close to zero or one on very many days. Winkler
(1994) develops a set of “skill scores” to help produce an average score that reflects the
ability of the forecaster instead of a combination of the forecaster’s skill and current
situation. These work to neutralize the situation’s contribution by comparing a forecaster’s
average score to the average score that a forecasting scheme, i.e. climatology, would
obtain. The most common weather forecasting skill score is the percentage improvement
over climatology in the average score, thus corresponding to a scoring rule S,
Skill = ( S − S Cl ) / S Cl where S Cl is the average score for climatology. The skill score does

have two shortcomings; even if S is strictly proper, the skill score is not and will therefore
not necessarily reward calibration and sharpness as would a strictly proper rule, and a
linear transformation of S can alter the values of the skill score which limits the skill score
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from being viewed as a standardized measure. However, if differences in average scores
are considered instead of percentage improvement, the strictly proper nature of S will be
maintained by the skill score, e.g. Skill = S − S Cl .
The main goal of Winkler (1994) is to develop strictly proper scoring rules that are
standardized, that will differ from previous rules because they are not symmetric (i.e. they
will not satisfy S1 (r ) = S 2 (1 − r ) ), and will have the capability to represent an evaluator’s
judgments about the associated difficulty of each forecasting situation. The benchmark to
measure by, denoted c, could be a base rate such as climatology or based on a utility of
forecasts in a decision problem, and when the forecast of c is given, unless its c = 0.5, the
scoring rule must be asymmetric to achieve a minimum average score. To generate a
family of strictly proper asymmetric scoring rules, define for any symmetric rule S and
c ∈ (0,1) , S ∗ (r ) = [ S (r ) − S (c)] / T (c) where T(c) = {S1(1) - S1(c) if r ≥ c, and S2(0) – S2(c)

if r ≤ c. Therefore S* is strictly proper because E p [ S ∗ ( p)] > E p [ S ∗ (r )] for r ≠ p since T
is positive and independent of r and E. As before with any strictly proper scoring rule, S*
rewards calibration, and in addition, S ∗ (r ) = [ S (r ) − rS1 (c) − (1 − r ) S 2 (c)] / T (c) . So for
well calibrated forecasters, S ∗ (1) = S ∗ (0) = 1 and additionally S ∗ (c) = 0 because
S (1) = S1 (1) and S (0) = S 2 (0) . The overall average score S ∗ is

S ∗ = ∑ g (r )[ S (r ) − rS1 (c) − (1 − r ) S 2 (c)] / T (c) . A well calibrated forecaster with a
distribution g(r) who provides r values approaching zero or one more frequently than
values approaching c will obtain a greater average score. The asymmetric scoring rule
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rewards skill whilst providing a measure of the skill when c is considered a benchmark
probability and skill is considered a capability of being more discriminatory than c.
An example provided by Winkler (1994) is the consideration of the quadratic rule
defined by S1 (r ) = 1 − (1 − r ) 2 and S 2 (r ) = 1 − r 2 . For this,
S1∗ (r ) = [(1 − c) 2 − (1 − r ) 2 ] / T (c) and S 2∗ (r ) = (c 2 − r 2 ) / T (c) where T (c) = c 2 if r ≤ c and
(1 − c) 2 if r ≥ c , thus using one quadratic function when r ≤ c and a different when r ≥ c .
For well calibrated forecasters, S ∗ (r ) = (r − c) 2 / T (c) . Figure 6.1 shows S1∗ (r ) , S 2∗ (r ) ,
and S ∗ (r ) for the only value in which S* is symmetric, c = 0.5, and figure 6.2, provided by
Winkler (1994, p.1399,1400), shows S1∗ (r ) , S 2∗ (r ) , and S ∗ (r ) for c = 0.2. Overall, the
reasoning for having an asymmetric scoring rule is to have the ability to measure
forecasting skill efficiently and so it is logical to have the smallest value for S (r ) occur
when r is the least skilled forecast.
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Sarin and Winkler (1980) are focused on incentive plans and how they can be used
to better motivate managers to forecast accurately and honestly, work harder to achieve the
goals set forth, and to act on behalf of the company’s best interests. Sarin and Winkler
(1980) review two types of goal based incentive plans, deterministic and probabilistic.
Deterministic goal based incentive plans involve rewards that are determined by
performance in relation to the goals set forth by the managers in the planning process, as
opposed to rewards based solely on the performance of the managers. Probabilistic goal
based incentive plans involve decision making and planning when uncertainty is involved
and that uncertainty is presented in the model with probabilistic terms. Sarin and Winkler
show how to design an incentive plan encouraging managers to report probabilistic goals
honestly. Here is where scoring rules become a topic of discussion, because using scoring
rules as incentive plans should make it easier to obtain honest reporting of uncertainty
about performance.
For decision making with uncertainty, the manager should provide a probability
distribution reflecting his uncertainty of the situation x, denoted x = (x1,…, xn) instead of a
single point estimate gi of xi for i = 1,…,n. The reported distribution is represented by q(x)
with Sarin and Winkler simplifying by assuming the distribution to be discrete rather than
continuous and the marginal distribution of xi is denoted by qi(xi) which is viewed as a
“probabilistic goal.” Achievement, denoted a i∗ , corresponds to [qi ( xi ), xi ] . The reward for
probability assessors that encourages honest probability reporting is expressed in terms of
a scoring rule s i [qi ( xi ), xi ] and is strictly proper if “it encourages honesty in the sense that
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an assessor’s expected score is maximized by honest reporting” (Sarin & Winkler, 1980
p.1139). Basically, if ri(xi) represents the managers judgments regarding xi and qi(xi) is the
managers reported distribution for xi and qi ≡ ri , then the reporting is honest. Therefore a
scoring rule si is strictly proper given the managers expected score

∑ s [q ( x ), x ]r ( x ) is
i

i

i

i

i

i

maximized if qi ≡ ri over all possible values of xi.
Though scoring rules encourage honest reporting they do not motivate managers to
work harder. To do so, the performance function should depend on s i [qi ( xi ), xi ] and
p1i ( xi ) , a function that represents preferences for values of xi. Therefore the performance
function pi is a function of qi(xi) and xi through si and p1i and the following condition
enables the decomposition of pi (note the i subscript is only dropped for convenience). The
condition states first; “if all managers have identical evaluations s(q,x) on a strictly proper
scoring rule s, then the decision maker’s evaluation of performance difference between any
two managers should not depend on s(q,x).” And second; “if all managers have identical
values of x, then the decision maker’s evaluation of performance difference between any
two managers should not depend on x” (Sarin & Winkler, 1980 p.1139). The theorem
declares that the condition is satisfied if and only if p(q, x) =λ 1 s(q, x) + λ2 p1 ( x) where

λ1 and λ 2 are scaling constants with λ1 , λ2 > 0 and λ1 + λ2 = 1 and s and p1 are scaled
between 0 and 1 for their worst and best values respectively. With respect to honesty
reporting motivation, for this theorem, “any positive linear transformation of s is a strictly
proper scoring rule, where the coefficient of the transformation may depend upon x but not
upon q, thus p(q,x) is a strictly proper scoring rule” (Sarin & Winkler, 1980 p.1139).
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The example provided by Sarin and Winkler employs the supposition that x
represents the subsequent month’s sales in thousands of units, where it is felt that 7.5 ≤ x ≤
10.5, and the manager is asked to make a probability assessments for values of x rounded
to nearest thousand, so that q(x) consists of the manager’s probabilities for x = 8, x = 9, and
x = 10, respectively. The decision maker has chosen a quadratic scoring rule,
10
⎡
⎤
s(q, x) = ⎢2q( x) − ∑ q 2 ( y ) + 1⎥ / 2 and assesses p1 ( x) = ( x − 8) 2 / 4 . The best possible
y =8
⎣
⎦

achievement corresponds to s = 1 and p1 = 1, implying that x = 10 and q = (0, 0, 1), and the
worst possible achievement corresponds to s = 0 and p1 = 0, implying that x = 8 and q = (0,
0, 1) or (0, 1, 0). For the assessment of λ1 and λ 2 , the manager should assign a
performance score p to an intermediate achievement, for instance q = (1, 0, 0) and x = 8
because the level of sales is low but predictably so by the manager, enabling the decision
maker to plan accordingly. Assessing p[q = (1, 0, 0), x = 8] = λ1 (1) + λ2 (0) = 0.2 , yields

λ1 = 0.2 , implying that that a high sales level which is assigned a zero probability [e.g., q
= (1, 0, 0), x = 10] should have a
performance score of

λ1 (0) + λ2 (1) = 0.8 . Table 6.1,
provided by Sarin and Winkler (1980,
p.1140), provides some select
performance scores of the example.
“Note that for a given q, p increases as
x increases, while for a given x, p increases as q becomes ‘more accurate’” (Sarin &
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Winkler, 1980 p.1140). In order for incentive plans based on probabilistic goals to work,
the manager’s performance and the relation of the performance to the reported probabilities
must be taken into consideration.
The consideration of the action of competition affecting the forecasters reported
probabilities is covered by Lichtendahl and Winkler (2007). Lichtendahl and Winkler
define the situation as; there exists an event E, a consultation of two forecasters to elicit the
probability of E from each, rewarding forecaster i (i = 1, 2) via a score Si from a strictly
proper scoring rule S that yields S E ( β i ) if E occurs and S E ' ( β i ) if its complement E’
occurs, where βi is forecaster i’s reported probability of E. Forecaster i’s probability for
event E is denoted by pi and i’s reporting strategy is represented by β i = bi ( pi ) and the
scoring rule is normalized so that 0 ≤ Si ≤ 1, where a higher score is better. They use the
normalized quadratic score for their examples, S E ( β i ) = 1 − (1 − β i ) 2 and S E ' ( β i ) = 1 − β i2 .
There is an additional assumption that forecaster i’s preferences can be represented
by a utility function that is additive in relative performance Ri and score Si,
u i ( Ri , S i ) = wi Ri + (1 − wi ) S i , where 0 ≤ wi ≤ 1 and Ri = 0(0.5)1 if Si <(=)> Sj, j ≠ i (i.e. if
i’s score is worse than, equal to, or better than the score of the other forecaster), and wi
represents forecaster i’s preference trade-off between relative performance and score.
Because the relative performance term does not depend on scoring rule that is used, if E
occurs, the forecaster with the higher βi has the better performance, with Ri = 1 (a tie can
occur at Ri = 0.5) and only the second term on the right side is specific scoring rule
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dependent. There are discontinuities associated with the utility function, through the
relative performance term, that are however justifiable considerations such as career
concerns (i.e. promotion or maintaining a current position). Nonetheless, the absolute
performance term is a continuous function of βi, and the discontinuity impact is dependent
on the size of wi which is reflective of the importance of the competition to the forecaster.
There are also the forecaster’s conditional beliefs to consider; forecaster i (i = 1,2)
knows her own probability pi and does not know the probability of the other forecaster, but
has the associated distribution. The conditional beliefs of forecaster i about pj (i = 1, 2, j ≠
i) given pi are represented by continuous cumulative distribution functions (cdfs) F p j |E , pi
and F p j |E ', pi , with corresponding probability density functions (pdfs) f p j |E , pi and f p j |E ', pi . It
is to be noted however that the provided distributions are distributions for the reported
probabilities, not the beliefs, which was determined can be different.
A second forecaster who doesn’t care about relative performance has a w2 = 0 thus
her utility equals her score, meaning that her beliefs about the first forecaster hold no
relevance making her optimal strategy the same as if she were the only forecaster under
evaluation, i.e. truthful reporting; β 2 = p 2 (Lichtendahl & Winkler, 2007). The following
proposition shows that truthful reporting is not necessarily the best response to combat
truthful reporting. The proposition states that “if 0 < wi <1, 0 < pi < 1, and forecaster 1
believes that forecaster 2 will report truthfully, truthful reporting satisfies the first-order
condition to be forecaster 1’s best response if and only if
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f p2 |E ', p1 ( p1 ) / f p2 | E , p1 ( p1 ) = p1 /(1 − p1 ) ” (Lichtendahl & Winkler, 2007 p.1747). The

example provided by Lichtendahl & Winkler is to use the normalized quadratic scoring
rule already presented and suppose that forecaster 1’s conditional beliefs about p2 are beta
with (c, d, c’, d’) = (2, 1, 1, 2), the first order condition for maximizing expected utility is

β1 = ( p1 − w1 ) /(1 − 2w1 ) and if p1 and w1 are such that this β1 ∉ [0,1] or the second order
condition (2wi − 1 ≤ 0) does not hold, then the optimal βi is zero or one. So when w1 < 0.5,
β1 = {0 if 0 ≤ p1 < p1∗ , α1 p1 + α 0 if p1∗ ≤ p1 ≤ 1 − p1∗ , and 1 if 1 − p1∗ < p1 ≤ 1 , where

α1 = 1 /(1 − 2w1 ) , α 0 = (1 − α 1 ) / 2 = − w1 /(1 − 2w1 ) , and p1∗ = −α 0 / α 1 = w1 . When w1 ≥
0.5, reporting extreme values is the best response: β1 = {0 if p1 < 0.5, 0 or 1 if p1 = 0.5, and
1 if p1 > 0.5. Intuitively, this strategy shows that forecaster 1 is willing to stray from her
beliefs and report higher probabilities in order to stand a better chance of winning the
competition and is thus making a trade-off between the two terms in her utility function
with a larger w1 corresponding to how much she is willing to trade on the score for the
relative performance term.
Lichtendahl and Winkler (2007) continue this competition theme with game theory
to analyze both forecasters’ decisions simultaneously (not as before with only one
forecaster’s decision based on her beliefs of the second forecaster’s probability and utility
function). Their focus involves each forecaster having the same utility function and the
same beliefs about the other forecaster’s abilities. Therefore, each forecaster’s utility
function is u i ( Ri , S i ) = wi Ri + (1 − wi ) S i with wi = w, i =1,2, the scoring rule is strictly
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proper, and the cdfs F p j |E , pi and F p j |E ', pi of each forecaster for the other forecaster’s private
information are continuous in pj for 0 ≤ pj ≤ 1, i =1,2, j ≠ i and symmetric in the sense
that F p2 |E , p1 ( p 2 ) = F p1|E , p2 ( p1 ) and F p2 | E ', p1 ( p 2 ) = F p1 |E ', p2 ( p1 ) for 0 ≤ p1, p2 ≤ 1. The
following proposition invokes symmetry of utilities and conditional beliefs. The
proposition states that “in this forecasting game, any strictly increasing, differentiable
piece of a nondecreasing Bayesian Nash equilibrium reporting function b(pi) must satisfy
the following differential equation:
w[ pi f p j |E , pi ( pi ) − (1 − pi ) f p j |E ', pi ( pi )] + (1 − w)[ p i s E' (b( pi )) + (1 − pi ) s E' ' (b( pi ))]b' ( p i ) = 0 ”
(Lichtendahl & Winkler, 2007).
Lichtendahl and Winkler provide an example with a quadratic scoring rule and beta
distributions representing the forecaster’s beliefs about their opponent’s beliefs. With the
application of the proposition equation, an ordinary, nonlinear, first-order differential
equation of b' ( pi ) =

w[ pi f Be ( pi | c, d ) − (1 − pi ) f Be ( pi | c' , d ' )]
is yielded. Now, if (c, d,
2(1 − w)[b( pi ) − pi ]

c’, d’) = (2, 1, 1, 2) the equilibrium reporting function, denoted p̂ equilibrium, when w >
2/3, is of the form b( pi ) = {0 if 0 ≤ p i < pˆ , α 1 pi + α 0 if pˆ ≤ p i ≤ 1 − pˆ , and 1 if
1 − pˆ < pi ≤ 1 where α 1 = (1 + 1 + 8[ w /(1 − w)]) / 2 , α 2 = (1 − α 1 ) / 2 , and p̂ =0.2893 is the
root of a quadratic equation, and extreme reporting is noted when w ≥ 2/3. This strategy
also implies that b(pi) should be closer to the extremes than to pi, with noted jumps at
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p̂ and (1 − pˆ ) due to comparison of the expected utilities along the solution to the first

order differential equation and reporting at the extreme values.
Lichtendahl and Winkler also consider this problem using the asymmetric case
which presents a scheme of two differential equations (one per forecaster) and different
reporting functions for the two forecasters. The first example entails the forecasters
differing in their approach to the importance of the competitive aspect of relative
performance, therefore w1 ≠ w2. If w1 = 0.25 and w2 = 0.5, the second forecaster will give
more extreme reports for intermediate values of p because he put more weight on the
relative performance term. The second example modifies the beliefs instead of the weights,
as in the previous example. This time w1 = w2 = 0.25 and the beliefs about and p2 are beta
with (c, d, c’, d’) = (1.25, 0.25, 0.25, 1.25) and (2, 1, 1, 2) respectively, showing that the
conditional distributions of p1 nearly dominate those of p2, almost suggesting that
forecaster 1 has more expertise. Overall the two examples suggest that the asymmetric
beliefs did not lead to as great a difference in reporting functions as did the asymmetric
weights. Lastly, knowing the utility functions and conditional beliefs of the other
forecaster gives the analyst an idea of the manipulation that can occur when forecaster’s
have an inkling of each others abilities and preferences.
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CHAPTER 7 Conclusion
Biased probability assessments can have a significant effect on the prescriptions
from a decision analysis. Many of the applications that have been discussed herein that use
probability assessments include consequences such as loss of life, health effects, and
environmental impacts. In such cases, minimizing the impact of biases on assessed
probabilities is critical. The goal of the decision analyst should be to provide an analysis
that is as error free as possible.
Biased judgments can be made both consciously and unconsciously by both experts
and non-experts alike. Heuristics play a key role in how people inject information into the
judged uncertainty and how that uncertainty is projected into usable probabilistic
quantities. Biases can and often do arise because of cognitive heuristics which may create
havoc on an analysis. To minimize such problems, elicitation methods have been
developed that include defining the problem in depth, training the assessor, eliciting the
probabilities via an interview process, and verifying the results. Such methodology can
eliminate most biases associated with the heuristics. Once the assessments are provided an
analyst can determine the reliability of the forecaster (i.e. how good the forecaster is), the
degree of calibration, and if the provided probabilities are coherent. If the probability
assessments are determined to be biased, several methods to reduce this bias were
provided. The assessments can be modified by calibrating them or by internally or
externally ensuring coherence. The original elicitation process may be redone, possibly
including a decomposition of the uncertainty into more manageable components. Lastly,
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scoring rules can be used to encourage more honest forecasting. Moreover, the entire
elicitation process will provide a reference for the expert to aid in the improvement of his
own assessment ability. The process will also provide a reference for the decision maker in
the determination of the forecaster’s assessment abilities, should the decision maker need
to call on that expert again for another decision analysis.
Proper elicitation and improvement methodology has been discussed for extruding
unbiased probability assessments, but there remains a great disconnect between the fields
of psychology and decision analysis when it comes to the subject of probability elicitation.
There is an abundance of literature available for the psychological reasoning behind why
the heuristics are utilized and the associated biases. There is an abundance of decision
analysis literature that encompasses probability assessments, calibration of forecasters,
scoring rules, how to elicit probabilities, etc. However, there is a lack of literature that
connects the two subjects together. Many decision analysis papers discuss the elimination
of biases but do not specify which biases their methods are trying to overcome exactly.
There are psychology-oriented papers that mention the link to decision analysis but do not
specify what methodology is employed. There is serious lack of connectivity between
these two areas addressing probability elicitation, the biases associated with it, and the
methods to overcoming how the biases are introduced. It seems apparent that decision
analysts and psychologists who are interested in the subject of probability elicitation
should collaborate to promote research that connects the two areas. Additionally, Benson,
Curley, and Smith (1995) outline some research opportunities for decision analysis in data
generation, argument construction, and associated judgments.
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There are other areas that could benefit from additional research as well. Each
improvement scheme; calibration, coherence, and scoring rules, is provided in a theoretical
design but with a lack of proof of improvement. It appears that no (or very limited) studies
have been performed to determine the exact affect of the methodologies, especially from a
psychological standpoint. In essence, the psychological literature stated the biases that can
be associated with heuristics, the decision analysts determined that training the subjects
will overcome the cognitive judgment associated biases, but the psychology research to
determine if the methods worked has not been performed. Additionally, there seem to be
methods specific to each improvement concept but not any overarching methods that can
incorporate multiple problems. For example, there is one methodology for calibration and
one methodology for dealing with incoherence, but there is not a method that can overlap
and involve both problems at once, though both problems are similar in stature.
Finally, there are many instances that are specific to probability elicitation that can
be improved upon and many independent methods for accomplishing the improvements.
There is not however, one standard overall process from start to finish that should
eliminate the biases that are customary to assessing uncertainty. A complete process might
include using the elicitation methods described in chapter four complete with subject
training and an all encompassing set up procedure, using decomposition to minimize
complexity, eliciting the assessments via the P and V methods with the addition of scoring
rules to encourage honesty, verifying the assessments and checking for miscalibration and
incoherence, and finally either repeating the process or manipulating the assessments
should any biased assessments be produced. Overall, there is quite a bit of research being
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done independently on each subject specific to probability elicitation. However, it appears
that little research is being conducted on the overlapping concepts between psychology and
decision analysis and also amongst the associated problems and the connectivity involving
the improvement methodologies.
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